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Nowadays, a project-winning environment is very competitive. In order to be 
successful and make profit, a contractor should start planning in advance and decide 
about what projects to bid. A prominent contractor should bid on projects for which 
his chances of winning are good enough or on projects for which the profit is high 
enough such that bidding would be worth consuming the resources needed for 
preparing the bid. The chances of winning bids are related to many factors but among 
all, degree of eminence (previous works) and price are the most important. In this 
thesis we have developed an optimization model that maximizes an index that takes 
both of these factors into consideration. Genetic Algorithm is used to solve this 
optimization model. The output of this model is the most beneficial set of projects 
and their respected optimal bid markups that will help the contractor make the most 
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Problem statement 
  
Contracting firms are project-oriented firms. They have to do projects to 
assure their survival. Projects are like the blood of a contracting firm. The profit of 
a contracting firm is related to the number of projects awarded. For each project 
available, there are usually many contracting firms that are competing with each 
other over that project. Because of the competitive environment, contractors have 
to be wise in selecting projects for bidding. They have to pick a portfolio of 
projects which benefits them the most for bidding. 
 
1.1 Project bidding and selection 
 The contractor has to make up his or her mind and choose a specific number 
of projects to bid on. There are several reasons behind not bidding on all projects, 
some of which are: 
1-Resource limitations: each contracting firm has a limited resource. Hence, if 
the contractor bids on as many projects as are available and ends up 
wining them all, due to the cap on his or her resources, they will face work 
overload. Because of the work overload, and since each contractor has a 
limited amount of resources, they have to either procure more resources 
and assign more human resource to manage all projects, or subcontract 
those projects to other contractors, if permitted in the contract. In both 
cases, the actual cost of the project will exceed the forecasted (estimated) 
cost of the project that was used for preparing the bidding documents. In 
the case of hiring and purchasing resources, since this acquiring is based 
on project needs (i.e., they are project based) the costs are more than the 
already available resources to the contractor. The same reason stands for 
the subcontracting case. 
2-The cost of preparing bids: Even by assuming that bidding on different 
projects is not constrained by resource limitations and the contractor has 




reasonable effort. Bidding on projects is in itself costly. Especially when, 
as Lin et al. have observed: "the development of a comprehensive proposal 
for a large project should itself be treated as a project for a project-oriented 
business" (Lin & Chen, 2004).  
3-The negative effect on reputation: In addition to the monetary cost of blindly 
bidding, bidding on lots of proposals and not winning many of them has a 
negative effect on the firm’s reputation (Gido & Clements, 1999). 
 Due to the reasons mentioned above, contractors have to bid on projects 
wisley. This is the reason why portfolio management is of high importance. 
Contractors bid on projects that have two characteristics: 
1-The projects satisfy their incentive of doing it. 
2-There is a good chance of winning them. 
 For finding the incentive, throughout the process that builds up to the 
bid/no-bid decision, contractors have to ask themselves what are the incentives 
that they have for doing a project. Some may want to be helpful to the society and 
profitability is of least importance for them. However, this applies only to a small 
group, if any at all. Monetary terms and financial profitability have always been 
the major incentives for doing projects. Some projects may have been done that 
have had less profit in order to pave the road for getting more profitable projects 
in the future. This kind of decision-making, which considers the future, is strategic 
decision-making. The project that the contactor decides to bid on has to be 
consistent with the strategic goal of the company/organization. 
 Contractors tend to bid on projects for which their chance of winning is 
high. The chances of winning projects are related to the evaluation criteria an 
owner/client has while evaluating tenders.  
 The profit of a contracting firm is highly correlated to the amount of projects 






1.2 Elements of project profit 
 The profit of each project is one of the main elements that affect the bidding 
prices, which is usually equal to the cost of the project plus a markup. Each of 
them has a series of characteristics: 
1-Project Cost: The cost that is measured at the beginning of a project is just 
an estimate of the actual cost. It has two elements: direct cost and indirect 
cost. Direct costs are those that are related directly to the project. Indirect 
costs are those portions of costs that are allocated to projects. They are 
costs that are not due to the direct labor or material or equipment of the 
project.  
2-Project Markup: The markup is the amount by which a contractor multiplies 
the costs of the project to calculate his or her bidding price. It usually 
consists of: general overhead, profit, and contingency, which are expressed 
in percentages (Lee & Chang, 2004).   
      The contingency factor exposes the inaccuracy of the cost estimate and the 
risk it may have. Therefore, depending on the nature of the project and the 
accuracy of the auction material (the plans, etc.) it can vary. Thus, the reasonable 
markup differs and the nature of the work may have a significant effect on the 
markup percentage. For example, Lee et al. have focused on developing the 
markup for micro tunneling projects (Lee & Chang, 2004). Since the bids are 
competitive, a contractor has to outbid his or her opponents while still keeping a 
reasonable profit. 
 There are many other factors that affect the overall price of the project. 
Many works have been executed to address those factors, one of which is the 
contract type and the effect it has on the price of the project. Paul and his 
colleague, have considered the effect the type of the contract (fixed price or cost 
plus) on the expected procurement cost. They have looked at the bidding problem 
from the owner’s viewpoint and have declared that in the case that the contractors 
are risk neutral, the smallest expected procurement cost for the owner will be from 
a fixed price contract (Paul & Gutierrez, 2005). There are still more attributes that 




 The profit has an effect on the probability of winning. There is a reasonable 
profit that results in a reasonable probability of winning the auction from other 
competitors. In order to come up with the probability of outbidding other 
competitors, a contractor has to have some historical data about the other 
competitors’ bidding behaviors. In other words, a historical distribution of the 
markup of the competitors is usually required. Assuming that the costs for 
different companies are more or less the same, which is valid when the different 
companies have almost the same experiences, the bidding price distribution for 
each project could easily be derived from the markup distribution for each 
opponent contractor. 
 
1.3 Project awarding Mechanisms 
 Owners provide projects to contractors using mainly two mechanisms: 
Granting a project by assigning to a contractor; granting the project by holding an 
auction. 
 Projects could be just assigned without any competition and challenge. This 
actually happens when the contractor is a large enough contractor and has the 
perfect relationship with an owner. The owner leans towards contracting with a 
contractor with whom he or she already has enough experience and believes that 
the contractor’s price and quality of work suits him or her the best. Not much 
research has been done on this type of project assignment.  
 The other type of winning a contract is through an auction or tender process. 
Giving projects through auctions has many benefits, including fairness and the 
competitive situation that leads to a better price for the client. 
When the bids are received, the auctioneer, who is usually the client 
(owner) of the project itself or a representative of the client, evaluates the bids and 
awards the project to the bidder, who from his or her point of view is the best 
among all other bidders. The criteria that are considered in evaluating the bidders 





1.4 Tender Evaluation criteria 
When an auction is held, there are always criteria that are used for 
evaluating tenderers. These criteria may vary from one client to another. They can 
be anything. Sometimes these criteria are known at the time of bidding and 
sometimes they are not. The weight of each criterion is largely dependent on the 
preferences of the client. The evaluation criteria can be categorized into two 
groups: monetary evaluation criteria and non-monetary evaluation criteria. 
1.4.1 Monetary Evaluation Criteria 
 Monetary criteria are among the major criteria to which the previous 
literature has paid attention.  The main monetary criterion is the bidding price. 
The bidding prices are evaluated depending on the type of auction. For instance, 
in the sealed-bid lowest price auction, the project is awarded to the bidder with the 
lowest price. So, the chance of winning the bid is equal to the probability of 
having the lowest bidding price. The sealed-bid price auction is a very popular 
method in public procurement auctions. 
 Only considering the bidding price used to be the most popular method for 
evaluating tenderers. However, it was found that considering only monetary terms 
and only the lowest bidding price would not necessarily lead to a successful 
project that would meet the budgeted time and cost. In fact, many of the projects 
that were awarded based on the lowest bidding price have had huge amounts of 
cost and time overruns (Conti & Naldi, 2008). These unsuccessful projects are 
usually a result of an anomalous bid. There is a positive correlation between the 
increase in bidding price and the decrease in the risk of projects not meeting their 
planned deadline and costs. In order to prevent time and cost overruns, different 
kinds of auctions and methods have been introduced that do not necessarily award 
the project to the lowest bidder. Some of these auctions consider the bidding price 
of all of the tenderers. Some samples of considering only monetary criterions and 
also eliminating anomalous bids are:  




price among all competitors is chosen as the winner of the auction.  
 Using the average submitted bid to eliminate the anomalous bids: As said 
before, this prevents the bad effect an anomalous bid has on procurement 
auctions. Conti and Naldi (2008) have proposed a method that is based on 
average submitted bid to detect the anomalous bids and put them aside in 
order to improve the performance of the project. In another effort to 
eliminate non-competitive bids, Skitmore (2002) has stated that in the case 
that the bids have a normal distribution; bids that are 1.47 times the 
standard deviation more than the mean are not competitive. Hence, clients 
and owners should not investigate them. 
 Because of many problems of this kind, many owners consider other criteria 
in addition to the bidding price to evaluate the bidders. They take into account 
different capabilities of the contractors to come up with a winner that can lead the 
project towards its goal with the minimum risk. These additional criteria that 
might be added to the monetary criteria to build a set of evaluation criteria that are 
important for an owner are called non-monetary criteria. These criteria could be 
any characteristic that the client (owner) believes are among the most important a 
bidder should have.  
1.4.2 Non-Monetary Evaluation Criteria 
 Non-monetary criteria are criteria that are not related to the proposed 
bidding price and owners use to evaluate different bids in an auction. As 
mentioned before, these criteria arose because of the lack of performance, which 
was a result of only considering monetary criteria when awarding projects. These 
criteria are widely used in different countries.  
 For example Lai, Liu, & Wang (2004) have noticed that in Beijing, the 
criteria to which points are assigned for project evaluation are: "(1) Degree of 
response to the bid document; (2) Construction organization design; (3) Firm’s 
honor and competence; (4) Bid prices and the amounts used of three materials 
(steel, cement and lumber); (5) Range for reducing cost; and (6) Comprehensive 
evaluation and examination". In order to define each of these criteria Lai and his 




of them.  
 Padhi & Mohapatra (2010) have collected some countries’ evaluation 
criteria for selecting construction contractors and have saved them in a table as 
shown in Figure 1-1. 
 
 
Figure 1- 1- Different Selection attributes used in different countries (Padhi & Mohapatra, 2010) 
 As it can be observed in Figure 1- 1, using non-monetary criteria along with 
monetary criteria is the widely used case in different countries. Using a 
combination of these two types of criteria will lead to minimizing the risk of poor 
performance and minimizing the cost of procurement for the owner. The relative 
importance of the monetary and non-monetary criteria depends on the owners’ 
preferences. In some cases the owners prefer to just minimize the risk as much as 
possible. Thus, as mentioned before, they tend to give their projects to some 
contractors without even holding an auction. This could be interpreted as paying 
the most attention to non-monetary criteria. In contrast, some owners are willing 
to take the risk of poor performance and only pay attention to the bidding price. 
These types often award the project to the tenderer with the lowest price. Their 
intention is to get the lowest price possible, which satisfies the minimum quality. 
One myth associated with paying importance to non-monetary criteria is if 
a client has some preferences in choosing some contractors over some others, and 




criterion, the cost of procuring the project will increase for the client. Hence, it is 
better to not have any preferences and non-monetary criteria. The study done by 
Hubbard and his colleague (Hubbard & Paarsch, 2009) addressed this myth. 
While in their research, the preferences are due to political reasons, for example, 
to support local businesses or small businesses, it is believed that these results can 
easily be expanded to any preferences of a contractor over another one due to any 
reason and criteria. 
 They investigated the effects of having preferences and treating different 
tenderers asymmetrically.  According to them, the common way to implement bid 
preferences is scaling the bids of preferred firms by a discount factor for just the 
purpose of evaluation. Further, whenever a bidder wins the auction he only gets 
what they have bid for. For instance, if the discount for a special contractor is 10% 
and his or her bidding price is $110,000, for the purpose of evaluation it will be 
treated as a bidding price of $99,000. If this owner wins the auction, he or she will 
be awarded the project for $110,000. 
 They introduced three effects of having preferential bidders on an auction. 
They are:  
1-The preference effect: the preferred bidder will inflate bids and still end up 
winning the auction. Therefore, the cost of the project will increase for the 
client. 
2-The competitive effect: In order to balance this asymmetry, non-preferred 
firms will bid closer to their actual costs (choose a lower markup), bid 
aggressively, and behave more competitively in response to the 
preferential policy. 
3-The participation effect: Although the incentives for preferred and non-
preferred bidders are different for participating in an auction with 
preferential bidders, they still do participate. They stated that the 
importance of this third effect is small and depends on the distribution of 
costs. 
At the end, they concluded that there is a positive discount number that 




to non-monetary criteria is a good method. It can even help reduce the overall 
expenditure of the owner. These results were valid for four different cost 
distributions (Weibull, normal, exponential, uniform). It is indeed not an 
expensive method. 
 
1.5 Main factors in evaluating bids 
 Assuming the main evaluation criterions for an owner is known, a contractor 
can increase his or her chances of winning by preparing and having a better 
performance on those factors compared to other competitors for that project. Since 
“the choice of one contractor over another is largely dependent on the client’s 
preferences in terms of the evaluation criteria and weightings used, and the trade-
offs they are willing to make” (Watt, Kayis, & Willey, 2009), finding these main 
criteria is of high importance. 
In order to have a good sense of what are the main criteria that 
owners/clients tend to have in evaluating auctioneers, Watt and his colleagues 
examined the management literature and conducted a survey on contractor 
selection and tender evaluation. They initially identified 16 mutually exclusive 
categories. After using a pragmatic and heuristic approach, they concluded that 
"the preferred criteria for evaluating tenders are those that show the contractors' 
ability in terms of their management and technical capability, past experience and 
performance, reputation, and the proposed method of delivery or technical 
solution.” Figure 1- 2 shows the categories of criteria and the number of 
occurrences of each of them in both literature and survey (Watt, Kayis, & Willey, 
2009). As it can be seen, the two major non-monetary criteria that grabbed the 
most attention were reputation and past performance. Therefore, doing projects for 
one owner will affect the chance of winning a project at a later auction held by the 
same owner. During those projects, if the contractor has satisfied the client in all 
or most of the important and related fields, he will have a higher chance of getting 
a higher score by that specific client in comparison to other contractors that have 





     
 
Figure 1- 2- Different Categories for tender evaluation and their occurrences in literature and surveys 
(Watt, Kayis, & Willey, 2009) 
 
 In a later research done by Watt and his colleagues, they looked at the 
relative importance of each of the most noticed criteria from their previous 
research to find the most important criteria of tender evaluation. It is worth stating 
that these relative importance criteria were based on the opinions of the 
contractors. They stated that: “Results indicate Past Project Performance, 
Technical Expertise and Cost are the most important criteria in an actual choice of 
contractor with Organizational Experience, Workload, and Reputation being the 
least important” (Watt, Kayis, & Willey, 2010). Once again, these critera can all 
be achieved and evaluated by doing succesful projects for the client. 
 Throughout their research, Watt and his colleageus stated that the quality of 
product was the most important criteria of contractor selection. Notably, this 
criterion was consistent in all industries (Watt, Kayis, & Willey, 2010). This is 




well and maintain the satisfaction of the client. Obviously, the client’s satisfaction 
depends on the quality of the work. 




Figure 1-3- Relative importance of evaluation criteria in tenders (Watt, Kayis, & Willey, 2010) 
 As mentioned throughout the entire chapter 1, in addition to the tender price 
and the monetary evaluation, doing successful projects for a specific client will 
increase the chances of winning future auctions held by that client quite 
dramatically. Therefore, this research focuses on helping contractors come up with 
a reasonable bid/no-bid decision and a suitable bidding price based on building 
reputation and doing successful projects for owners. The reputation of a firm 
depends on both the number of projects done or successfully awarded and the 
firm’s performance in those projects. A project with a good quality and high 
performance will positively affect a firm’s reputation. On the other hand, if the 





In this research we have assumed that the qualities of the projects are high and 
therefore any project awarded to the firm will result in an increase in the 
reputation. Thus from here on the term “reputation” will be exchanged with 
“eminence” and should be interpreted as the number of projects awarded. 
 
1.6 Problem Statement 
The goal of this research is to maximize the expected profit of a contractor. In 
order to do so, an index that represents the expected profit of a contractor is 
maximized by finding the most profitable set of projects to bid on. In addition to 
the projects selected for bidding a relative markup is proposed as well. This 
markup is proposed in a way that considers the effect doing a project for a specific 
client at current time has on the likelihood of winning a bid from that client in the 
future.  
 A graphical illustration of this problem is provided in Figure 1- 4. As it 
can be seen, at each time several projects are provided by different clients/owners. 
The goal is to select the best set of projects for bidding to maximize profit. Once 
the projects are selected for bidding, at each time, the auctions happen and based 
on the outcomes and new data about projects an update occurs. Therefore this is a 





Figure 1- 4 Graphical represantation of probelm 
 
1.7 Motivation and contributions 
Projects are the main source of income for a contracting firm. In an 
environment that is so project-orientated and challenging, blindly selecting 
projects for bidding will in no way guarantee success. In such an environment, the 
contractors should wisely select projects for bidding in a way that maximizes their 
chances of winning and their profits. During this research, the following 
contributions are made: 
 Proposing a new mathematical model that considers both monetary and, 
non-monetary criteria, namely, previous works and number of projects 
awarded. (eminence) 
 Considering the effect that winning a project has on the chance of winning 
future projects in the project selection decision-making (Portfolio 
selection).  
 Combining the bid/no-bid, markup size, and project selection decision-
making. 
 Using a Genetic Algorithm (GA) as a meta-heuristic to solve the nonlinear 





1.8 Structure of the thesis 
This thesis is organized as follows. In chapter 1, an introduction to the 
project selection and bidding decision-making was provided. Chapter 2 will 
address related previous works done in the field of project selection and making a 
bid/no bid decision. In chapter 3, we will define how the model is structured. In 
chapter 4, the mathematical model is presented. In chapter 5, a method (GA) for 
solving the optimization problem is suggested and implemented. In chapter 6, the 
results of the model, which are two characteristics of considering the effect that 
past project performance has on the project selection and bidding markup, are 
explained and sensitivity analysis is done on the various parameters of the model. 
Finally, in chapter 7, the conclusions of this research are presented and 





Chapter 2: Literature review 
 
According to Ahmad, the regular practice in making bid/no-bid decisions is 
based on intuition and gut feelings, which themselves are based on experiences, 
and guesses (Ahmad, 1990). Ahmad’s statement has also been supported by a 
finding Egemen and his Colleague had when they analyzed the questionnaires that 
were filled out by 80 small and medium-sized contracting firms from the Northern 
Cyprus and Turkey regions. Their finding was that 92.5% of the responding 
contractors have never used a statistical or mathematical model as a tool to help 
them in making bid/no bid and markup size decisions. Further, almost all of them 
(97.5%) used intuition as their primary tool in decision-making process (Egemen 
& Mohamed, 2007). 
Making the bid/no-bid decision along with making the markup decision just 
based on intuition will decrease the chances of the company’s success. Hence, 
many researchers have developed methods to assist the contractors to make the 
bid/no-bid decision and the markup size for preparing the bid to help the company 
succeed in the long run. 
Some of the major researches done in the bid evaluation criteria were 
presented in chapter 1. In this chapter we will cover the bidding decisions which 
the contractor has to make. 
In the following, first, we will go through previous works that have considered 
monetary criteria and, later, we will mention those works that have considered 
non-monetary criteria, as well as monetary criteria. 
 
2.1. Models based on monetary criteria 
 As mentioned before, contractors tend to bid on projects for which their 
chance of winning is high. The chances of winning projects are related to the 
evaluation criteria an owner/client has while evaluating tenders. One of the major 




bidding prices are evaluated depending on the type of auction. For instance in the 
sealed bid lowest price auction, the project is awarded to the bidder with the 
lowest price. So, the chance of winning the bid is equal to the probability of 
having the lowest bidding price. 
 By having the mean markup and the variance of the markups for each 
tenderer from historical data, the total bidding price of them can be simulated. It 
has mostly been treated as a random variable from a specific distribution. 
According to previous works, these specific distributions have been: Normal; 
Lognormal; Weibull; or just positively Skewed (Skitmore, 2002). 
 When there are just two companies competing over the project, the chance 
of outbidding the competitor can be calculated by knowing his or her distribution 
of the Markup (Bid-price/Cost ratio). In order to have an estimate of thsituation 
case where there are multiple competitors, two well-known models were derived: 
Friedman’s model (Friedman, 1956); and Gates’ model (Gates, 1967). Each has a 
set of assumption and its own supporters. Since these models were first developed 
within the years 1956 and 1967, there has always been a controversy between the 
supporters of each. Friedman’s model is more pessimistic in contrast to the Gates 
model, which is more optimistic. 
 Crowley has discussed the long-lasting controversy between the Friedman 
and Gates models for the probability of winning. He has used Carr's model (Carr, 
1982) as a basis of his evaluation and has concluded that the Gates model 
produces bids more similar to Carr's model than to Friedman's model, since Gates’ 
model considers the variability of cost estimate and does not assume the project 
cost to be deterministic. At the end, Crowley has stated that although Friedman's 
model is theoretically correct, the bidding problem is incorrectly specified due to 
the assumption that the cost estimates are the same among different bidders. On 
the other hand, Gates’ model is practically correct although it is lacking enough 
proof. Therefore, he has mentioned it might be best to use Carr's model (Crowley, 
2000).   
  Crowley has gone through the story of the controversies between the two 




 Carr in 1982 introduced a model that considered costs not to be a fixed 
amount in contrast to what Friedman's model assumed when calculating the bid-
to-cost ratio. He used his model as a reference and after comparing his model to 
the models presented by Friedman and Gates, he came up with a conclusion that 
Gates model seems to be more accurate and similar to his model(Carr, 1982). 
 Griffis stated that the difference between the two models is a result of the 
assumption of independence. The Gates model does not need that assumption 
while Friedman's model does. In addition, he states that the use of both 
approaches is acceptable for bidding (Griffis, 1992). 
 Skitmore and his colleagues have argued that using the Gates method for 
determining probabilities of winning bids in a closed bid competitive auction "is 
valid if, and only if, bids can be described using the proportional hazards family of 
statistical distributions." They have argued that assuming a Weibull distribution 
for the bids is essential when applying Gates’ method for calculating probabilities 
of winning (Skitmore, Pettitt, & McVinish, 2007). 
 In a research done by Hosni and his colleague, they have automated the 
three steps of coming up with an optimum markup estimation. The three steps are: 
a) building a database of other competitors bidding behaviors (markups) and 
updating it, b) predicting the competitors’ bidding behaviors c) selecting an 
optimum bidding markup. They have used Friedman’s model to combine the 
different competitors’ probabilities of winning (Hosny & Elhakeem, 2012).     
 In this research we will introduce both the Gates’ and Friedman’s models 
to predict the chances of winning the auction based on the bidding prices 
(markup). 
 
2.2 Research considering monetary and non-monetary criteria 
At this point, we will look at research that considers the non-monetary criteria. 
These are mainly research that can be categorized in the bid/no-bid decision-




Oo and his colleagues have compared different environmental scenarios and 
measured the effects of those scenarios and situations on a bid/no bid decision. 
Their study has been done in Hong Kong and Singapore. They have collected data 
from different medium-size and large-size contractors. The situations that they 
have considered are:  
(1) different market conditions. At one extreme it is recession that leads to a 
high desire to have work, and the other extreme is when there is a low need for 
work due to an already sufficient amount of workload. They have measured the 
probability of a bid/no-bid decision under the influence of changes to market 
conditions;  
(2) different number of bidders and their influence on the bid/no-bid decision 
(Oo, Drew, & Lo, 2008).  
 In another research study, Egemen and his colleagues introduced a 
framework to make strategically correct decisions in the two distinct but 
sequential bidding decisions, the bid/no bid decision and the related markup. They 
have concluded that any model regarding the bidding and mark-up size should 
"definitely differentiate" among different sizes of contractors. Further, they stated 
that the correlation between markup prices in different sizes of contractors was 
more than the correlation regarding the bidding decision process (Egemen & 
Mohamed, 2007). 
 Egemen and his colleague have also proposed a practical knowledge-based 
system software called SCBD to help the contractors identify a 'strategically 
correct' bid/no bid and markup size decisions. They have developed a user-
friendly software that assists the contractors reach those decisions. The accuracy 
of their model which was based on the similarity to real data from contractors 
bidding behaviors in bid/no bid decisions was 86% percent and in the markup size 
decision was 1.75%. They have considered different factors in their decision-
making process, factors thar are related to the firm itself (size, etc.), to the market, 
and to the project (Egemen & Mohamed, 2008). 
 Cagno and his colleagues have described a simulation approach based on the 




point of view in a competitive bidding process where the bids are evaluated based 
not only on price. The criteria that he and his colleagues have taken into account 
were basically criteria that are important in plant design construction and some 
important elements that are addressed within the contract such as:  delivery time; 
technology assistance; technology transfer; safety; price; dependability; process 
technology; terms of payment; financial package; liquidated damages clause; 
conformity to tender documents; contractors co-operation; and utilization of local 
vendors (Cagno, Caron, & Perego, 2001).  
 Lin and his colleague have identified 21 important factors for determining 
markups from a contractor’s point of view. They indicated that among those 
factors those that were related to the clients (owners) characteristics, for example, 
payment record and size & type of client, were the most important. They adopted 
a fuzzy logic approach which helps the contractors make the bid/no-bid decision 
faster and thus allows the contractors to have more time for preparing completer 
RFPs. (Lin & Chen, 2004). 
 Ahmad and his colleague have analyzed a survey which was conducted 
among 400 of the top general contractors in the US. Based on the results, they 
have concluded that type of job and need of work are the top factors in making the 
bid/no-bid decision. Moreover, the top factors for making the markup decision 
have been identified to be: degree of hazard and degree of difficulty. They have 
observed that Potential client/owner relationship, quality of 
architectural/engineering design, and reliability of subcontractors have 
considerable influence on the pair of bid decisions (Ahmad & Minkarah, 1998).  
 Lee and his colleague have concentrated on determining the bid markup for 
micro tunneling projects which are associated with uncertainties. They have 
developed a decision support system based on survey results which assists the 
contractors in selecting an appropriate markup (Lee & Chang, 2004). 
 More detailed information about bidding especially in the construction 





As mentioned in chapter 1 and 2, although there are mathematical models 
that help the contractors in project bid/no-bid and markup decision-making, most 
of them only consider monetary criteria. The other models that consider non-
monetary criteria as well, are mainly multi criteria decision-making models, and 
do not provide a mathematical formulation as their basis for decision-making. 
Moreover, to the best of the author’s knowledge there is no model that does 
portfolio management and project selection for a contractor and considers projects 
that are available later. Most of the research which is done from the contractor’s 
side and point of view focuses on just one project. 
In this thesis we will consider a pool of available projects and assist the 
contractor to select the most profitable portfolio of projects. We will consider the 
effect that doing a project for a specific owner has on the chances of winning a 





Chapter 3: Elements of the project selection model 
 
Since the importance of doing previous works (and improving the 
eminence) for designated owners has been shown in the previous chapters, a 
mathematical model that can assist the contractors in selecting projects and a 
bidding markup for those project is very valuable. 
The model we are proposing has two major elements: 
1- The bidding price. 
2- The contractor’s  index of eminence and previous works done for the 
project provider. 
 
3.1 Bidding Price 
This element has been the focus of many previous investigations by many 
researchers. Researchers have come up with different models that give the 
contractors an estimate of what they could expect to have as a profit. The expected 
profit for each project can be defined as the profit that is expected from the project 
if the project is going to be selected to be done. It can be easily represented by 
equation (3-1): 
 
 (  )              (3-1) 
 
Where: 
  (  ): is the expected profit for project “i”. 
      : is the probability that project “i” would be awarded to the 
contractor. 




By having the expected profit of each project, the overall expected profit for a 
contractor based on the projects in which he will choose to participate would be as 
follows (equation (3-2)): 
 
∑        (  )  ∑               (3-2) 
 
But for all projects that are available the correct formula will be: 
 
∑        (  )  ∑                 (3-3) 
 
Where    is a binary variable which indicates whether or not the project will be 
selected for bidding. 
The profit of the project can be calculated as the difference between the 
bidding price and the cost of that project. Since the bidding price is equal to the 
cost of the project plus a percentage markup, the profit of the project can be 
calculated using equation (3-4): 
 
         (   )          (3-4) 
 
Where: 
  : is the bidding price of the project. 
  : is the cost of the project 




By knowing the profit, the only non-clear part of the expected profit 
equation is the probabilities of winning the auction. This is equal to the probability 
of having the lowest bidding price. 
In order to win an auction based on price, a contractor has to have the 
lowest bidding price. By assuming that the cost estimates of any unique project 
done by different contractors are the same, the lowest bidding price will be 
equivalent to the lowest markup by a contractor. 
Having the assumption that all contractors have the same estimates of a 
project’s cost is not that much far from reality if it is assumed that all contractors 
have a good amount of knowledge about the project and have enough experience 
in those kinds of projects. In other words, the contractors are the same size. 
In order to find the lowest bidding markup percent among all contractors, 
all of the bidding markups from different contractors need to be known, but they 
are not. A contractor has to assume a markup distribution for the other 
participants. The contractor can generate that distribution based on the past 
bidding behavior of other contractors. If the mean and the variance of the markups 
of other competitors are known, the contractor can draw a distribution for other 
competitors’ markup. 
If no historical data about the bidding markup of a competitor is available, 
it is rational to assume that he will be bidding the same as an average bidder in 
that industry. Hence the mean will be equal to the mean of the industry and the 
variance will be derived from the industry. 
When the distributions for other competitors are known, the probability of 
winning a bid will be equal to the probability of the bidding markup presented by 
the contractor being less than the minimum bidding markup of the other 
contractors. In Figure 3- 1, a normal distribution is illustrated for the markups. 
The colored area under the curve that is smaller than “a” represents the probability 
of losing in the auction when the markup percent is equal to “a”. All of the points 
on the horizontal axis that are smaller than “a” represent bidding markups that are 




equal to the area that is not colored (the white area under the curve). This is equal 
to one minus the probability of losing.  An example is illustrated below.  
 
Figure 3- 1 The distribution of markups following a normal distribution 
Assume that a contractor is using a markup of 8% and from previous 
history he knows that his or her only competitor’s mean markup has been 9% with 
the coefficient of variance (C.O.V.) of 4%. By assuming that the distribution of 
the markup for the competitor is normal, the contractor’s chance of winning is 
equal to: 
1-0.309 = 0.691 = 69.1% 
Where, 0.309 is the colored area that can be calculated from MS Excel using the 
=NORM.DIST(8,9,2,1) formula.  
The main question about the probabilities of winning arises when there is 
more than one competitor in an auction. In this case, what is the probability of 
winning the auction and having the lowest bid among all competitors? 
There are two main models that are used for calculating the probability of 
winning among all competitors who are competing to win the auction: 
1- Friedman’s model 
2- Gates’ model  
3.1.1 Friedmans model 
Friedman’s model is the first model that addressed the issue of 
probabilities of winning a multi-competitor auction (Friedman, 1956). Friedman 
had one main assumption which was: the probability of winning each competitor 




assumed that the uncertainties in the marginal bids by contractors are independent. 
Hence, based on the characteristics of probabilities, the overall probability of 
winning all competitors can be calculated by equation 3-5: 
 
     ∏     (3-5) 
 
Where:  
   : is the probability of winning against competitor i,, equivalent to having 
a markup less than the markup of the competitor. 
  : is the index on the set of n competitors bidding in for the project. 
In the case that the competitors’ previous bidding behaviors are not 
known, and the chance of winning a project compared to the industries mean is 
equal to      the Friedman’s formula can be written as equation 3-6: 
 
                      (    )
  (3-6) 
 
As the number of competitors rise, the probability of winning decreases. 
For example, if the chance of an auction from an average bidder in the industry is 
50% the chance of 5 average bidders will be only (0.5)^5 = 0.03. This is a very 
low probability..    
3.1.2 Gates model 
Gates’ empirical model was developed after Friedman’s model. He 
developed his model based on the concept that the competitors’ probability 
distributions are not mutually independent as opposed to Friedman’s model. The 
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Where: 
   : is the probability of winning from competitor i.  Winning from 
competitor i is equivalent to having a markup less than the markup of the 
competitor. 
  : is the index on the set of n competitors bidding in for the project. 
In the case that the distribution of the competitors is unknown, the 
formulation will be modified as shown in equation 3-8: 
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      is the probability of winning from an average competitor in the 
industry. 
 n: is the number of competitors. 
Obviously, in this model as the number of competitors grows the 
probability of wining from all competitors decreases. For instance, if the 
probability of winning a typical bidder is 0.5 then the probability of winning 5 
typical (unknown) bidders will be:  
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This is as opposed to the 0.03 resulting from the Friedman’s model. As 
mentioned before, the Gates’ model is generally more optimistic than the 
Friedman’s model. 
As it was mentioned throughout chapter 1, among all elements that are 
used by owners to evaluate the contractors participating in an auction, the bidding 
price and the previous projects done by the contractor for the owner (eminence) 
are of the highest importance. Considering eminence in the decision making 
process leads to many desirable outcomes.  It helps differentiate between the 
firms’ sizes (large, medium, small) that according to research done are important 
in the project selection decision-making.  This could be done by setting a higher 
degree of eminence for larger firms. It also helps consider the effect of having 
preferential bidders, which as explained in the previous chapters, is somehow 
desirable by assigning more eminence to preferred bidders.  
 
Inserting reputation into the model was done by the use of weighting 
indexes. This can be simply done by giving a higher weight to those projects for 
which the contractor’s relationship with the owner is more eminent. Hence, the 
chance of winning the project is higher. 
The questions that arise at this point are: How should different weights be 
assigned to different levels of eminence? How much should the eminence have an 
effect on choosing to bid on a project or not? What is the cap that should be put on 
or used? What should represent the weight of the price factor? 
We have dealt with these different weights in this research by the use of 
relative weights. If the weight of eminence and previous works is high (being 
eminent is very important) this will imply that the weight of the bidding price is 
low and vice versa. These questions are answered in chapter 4 where the model is 






Chapter 4: Project selection model, based on eminence and 
bidding price 
 
4.1 Objective Function formulation 
The objective of this research is maximizing an index which will 
maximize the profit of the contractor by helping him or her strategically choose 
the best set of projects on which to bid. As mentioned in the previous chapters, 
considering non-monetary factors in the process of decision making is important. 
And among all of the non-monetary criteria previous works and eminence are very 
important. Thus, the index which is presented for valuing different projects 
considers this non-monetary criterion. It also considers the bidding price and its 
relative markup as the main monetary criteria. Each of these monetary and non-
monetary criteria is factored in by using probability theory. 
For the monetary part, the probability of winning from each of the other 
participants in the auction based on the markup is used. Calculations regarding the 
probability of winning based on price (markup) were provided in chapter 3. Then 
the overall probability of winning based on price from all competitors is computed 
using Friedman’s method.  
For the non-monetary part, a shape and probability of winning based on r 
is proposed in the following subsection.  
4.1.1 The Eminence probability 
At each point in time, depending on the relationship a contractor has with 
the one who is in charge of the auction (owner), the probability of winning against 
other contractors who are competing can be estimated. The relationship between a 
contractor and the owner (degree of eminence) is based on the successful previous 
works. Once the probability of winning from other competitors based on eminence 
alone is known, the overall probability of winning can be calculated by using 




The probability of winning against each competitor can be simulated as the 
probability of winning an auction just based on eminence from every other bidder 
with an average profile (i.e., the chance of winning from an average industry 
bidder based on eminence). Thus we need a probability function based only on 
eminence that for every contractor at each time provides the probability of 
winning against other contractors. This is equivalent to the probability of having 
done more or equal number of projects than the competitor. If the shape of the 
Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) is known, the probability of winning 
based on eminence which is equal to having done more projects for the owner can 
be derived.  This probability depends on the number of projects done and the 
initial eminence with the owner. The initial eminence is based on the number of 
previous projects which were awarded at earlier times, times before the model is 
being executed. We assume that the probability (CDF) due to eminence can be 
presented using a piecewise linear function. Figure 4- 1 illustrates a portion of the 
an example CDF. The horizontal axis in Figure 4- 1 is the expected number of 
projects awarded (decided to bid on), and the vertical axis is the probability of 
winning the bid based on just eminence. The entire CDF starts from the 
probability of Zero and increases. However in Figure 4- 1 only a portion of the 
CDF is shown. The portion that is important in this optimization model. 
 
Figure 4- 1- The growth in the probability of winning due to eminence 
As observed in Figure 4- 1, the probability of winning from an average 




The rate of increase in the probability is high for the first few projects won if the 
initial probability of wining is low (Less than Lim1). As the probability of 
winning increases, the change of the probability due to doing each successful 
project decreases. The increase continues until the probability reaches “1” which 
means that if the auctions are solely based on reputation, the project will be 
awarded to the contractor.   
The eminence function can be written as equation 4-1: 
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Where:  
      denotes to the expected number of projects awarded to the contractor 
up to time “T” by owner “C”. Since time “T” is in the future, this value is 
stochastic. The expected number of projects provided by owner “C” that 
are selected for bidding until time “T” is used as opposed to the actual 
number which is not available. 
        : The probability of winning the n’th project that owner “c” has 
provided at time “t” with the bidding price scenario of “k”. This 
probability is just based on the bidding price and is calculated by using 
either the Friedman’s model or the Gates’ model. 
        : Binary variable which indicates the selection of the n’th project 
owner “c” has provided at time “t” under the bidding markup which is 
associated with the k’th scenario. (If project selected under the bidding 
scenario of “k”:        =1, other wise        =0 ). 
Once the number of previous won bids is calculated, by using the initial 
eminence at time 1 the probability of winning based on eminence can be 
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Where: 
        ’s are the limits to the number of projects done in each part of the 
piecewise linear function (The breakpoints for the slope in the eminence 
probability). 
     : The probability of winning from another competitor in an auction that 




   : The slope of the probability function. 
       The limit on the probability for eminence before/after a change in 
slope happens. 
     : The initial eminence probability with owner “c” at time “t=1”. 
The        ’s can be calculated as follows: 
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The overall probability of winning in an auction from all other competitors 
which is solely based on eminence  can be combined and calculated using either 
the Friedman’s method or Gates’ by using equations 4-6 and 4-7: 
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     : The probability of winning from one average bidder who bids on a 
project that owner “c” provides at time “t” solely based on eminence 




        : The number of competitors who are competing for the “n”’th 
project that owner “c” is providing at time “t”. 
4.1.2 Objective function 
The overall objective function which considers both monetary and non-
monetary criteria is as follows (equation 4-8): 
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Where the uppercase words and alphabets represent parameters and constants 
and the lowercases represent variables. The variables are defined as follows: 
        : Binary variable which indicates the selection of the n’th project 
owner “c” has provided at time “t” under the bidding markup which is 
associated with the k’th scenario. (If project selected under the bidding 
scenario of “k”:        =1, otherwise        =0). 
      : A real auxiliary variable that represents the probability of winning 
the n’th project at time “t” from owner “c” solely based on eminence. 
 
The parameters in the objective function are: 
        : The markup % associated with the k’th scenario of bidding for the 
n’th project that owner “c” provides at time “t”.  
         : The cost estimate of doing the n’th project owner “c” provides at 
time “t”. 
    : The relative importance of the price factor in evaluating bids for 
owner “c”. It is an input to the model which ranges between 0 and 1. 
Setting this parameter equal to 1 means that for client, “c”, price is the 




        (                     )         ” will be equal to the 
expected profit just based on price. The probability of winning due to price 
in this expected profit is calculated by either Friedman’s or Gates’ model. 
    : The relative importance of the eminence factor in evaluating bids for 
owner “c”. This parameter is equal to 1 minus the importance of price. So, 
if the importance of price is high, the relative importance of eminence is 
low (the formulation is provided in equation 4-9). 
 
   =1-             (4-9) 
 
       : A weighting factor which represents the likelihood of the “n’th” 
project which owner “c” provides at time “t” actually being provided in 
tender. This weighting factor is an input from the contracting firm which 
uses this model. The amount of this varies between 0 and 1 (1 representing 
100 percent likelihood). By definition, this should be equal to one for 
projects which are definitely available at time 1. Since, this parameter is an 
input to the model, if a contractor is optimistic or risk prone, he will tend 
to give higher likelihoods than one who is pessimistic or risk averse. 
        : The probability of winning the n’th project that owner “c” has 
provided at time “t” with the bidding price scenario of “k”. This 
probability is just based on the bidding price and is calculated by using 
either the Friedman’s model or the Gates’ model. 
 
4.2 Resource Constraints 
Every optimization model has a set of constraints and limitations that build 
up the domain of the optimization problem (the feasible region). The following 




4.2.1 Project Manager Constraint 
This set of constraints is needed because of the limited number of Project 
Managers (PM) each contractor has. Each contractor has a certain and known 
number of PMs to carry out all projects. The number of Project Managers may 
vary by time. Each project has a certain amount of resource requirements at each 
time. The PM requirement of each project may also vary by time. For the purpose 
of satisfaction of the PM constraint, the total number of PMs working at different 
projects at each time should be less than the total quantity of the resources 
available to the contractor’s company. 
Since the problem that we are trying to address is a planning problem, the 
knowledge of exactly what is going to happen is not available, i.e., this problem is 
only for the purpose of helping the contractor make a decision on whether to bid 
or not to bid. Therefore when the decision is made, there is no assurance that the 
contractor will win the auction. The contractor has to use a level of contingency 
when solving the problem. For example, if the contractor has R amount of a 
resource, when planning it is suggested to use (1+c)*R amount of resource as the 
limitation, in which c is the percentage of contingency the contractor is using. 
By having this in mind, the formulation of the PM resource constraint is 
shown in equation 4-10 for each time period and the projects that are on-going 
during that time period: 
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Where:  
      : the total number of project managers the firm has at time “tv” 
including the contingency explained earlier. 
        : Binary variable which indicates the selection of the n’th project 




associated with the k’th scenario. (If project selected under the bidding 
scenario of “k”:        =1, otherwise        =0). 
       : the number of project managers which the n’th project that owner 
“c” provides at time “t” requires per each time period it is ongoing.  
 TV: is the total time horizons that should be considered. The calculation of 
it is provided bellow. 
TV at its utmost is calculated by equation 4-11: 
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Where: 
      : the duration of the n’th project that owner “c” provides at time “t” 
    ( )   : The last time we are considering for projects to be available 
When the projects are completed, the resources they are consuming will be 
available again. The formula provided above for each project stands for the period 
that project is on-going. A set of auxiliary variables is used to recognize the time 
periods for projects that are chosen for bidding under any bidding price and 
scenario to be used in the constraint. These auxiliary variables are calculated by 
using the formula presented below: 
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Where: 
 h: is the time period in which the project is on-going (has started and is 




      : The duration of the project that starts at time “t” and is the n’th 
project which is offered by owner “c” at time “t”. 
        : The auxiliary variable that indicates whether the project which is 
specified with the index c,t,n is ongoing at time “h” or not. This is a binary 
variable which it is equal to 1 when the project is ongoing and 0 otherwise. 
      : An auxiliary binary variable which states whether project c,t,n is 
selected for bidding under any bidding scenario or not. If selected the 
value for this variable is 1, otherwise it will be 0.  
Now that for each time it is known whether a project is still ongoing or not 
if selected for bidding, the PM constraint can be illustrated as equation 4-14: 
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Where: 
           : Is the amount of PM resources needed at time “TV” for the 
n’th project that owner “c” provides at time “t”.  
 TV: is the total time that is being considered. It is equal to the final time 
any project is provided added by the duration of the longest project. 
      : The total number of project managers the company has at each 
time, “TV”, by taking into account the required level of contingency. 
In the case that the resources needed at each time period is uniformly 
distributed, the            can be calculated using equation 4-15: 
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Where        is the uniform number of project managers that the n’th 





4.3 One scenario happening constraint 
In the models presented by Friedman and Gates, each bidder has a 
distribution. Hence depending on the bidding markup, the probability of winning 
the other auctioneers can be calculated. The number of bidding scenarios 
considered for each project depends on the amount of accuracy desired. If it is set 
to 3, we would be considering only three markups. If it is set to 100 we would be 
considering 100 different markups. Under any type of scenario categorization, 
only one scenario will happen for each project. Hence: 
 
∑            (4-16) 
 
4.4 The model type 
From the structure of the model, it can be seen that all constraints are 
linear. However, the objective function is a nonlinear objective function. 
Therefore in general the problem is a Non-Linear Program with Integer (Binary) 
variables (NLIP). 
Based on the theorem provided below, if the objective function is concave, 
finding the optimal solution would be easy using a hill climbing method or a 
commercial optimization solver. 
Theorem: Consider a NLP and assume it is a maximization problem. 
Suppose the feasible region S for the NLP is a convex set. If the objective function 
is concave on S, then any local maximum for the NLP is an optimal solution to 
this NLP (Winston, 2003). 
All constraints are linear and thus the feasible region is convex. The only 
part that remains to be checked is the objective function. Since the problem that is 
to be solved is a maximization problem, it is very much desirable if the objective 




In the following subsection the convexity/concavity check is explained. 
4.4.1 Convexity/Concavity check 
A function, f, is concave on a convex set S whenever for any          
and       (Winston, 2003): 
 
 [    (   )  ]    (  )  (   ) (  ) (4-17) 
 
The Convexity/Concavity of a function can also be checked by calculating 
the Hessian matrix. If the Hessian matrix is positive semi-definite (PSD), the 
function is Convex. The Hessian Matrix was calculated and it was observed that it 
does not follow any special structure and it is not PSD. Therefore the objective 
function is not convex (concave). Because of this, when Xpress-mosel software 
was used it gave errors about the convexity check not being passed. And, when 
the convexity check was set off manually, the optimal solution provided by 
Xpress was a local optimal and that was far inferior to the global optimal, even for 
a small-sized example. It was concluded that in order to solve this problem, a 
different procedure should be developed. 
 
4.5 The mathematical model summary 
The entire optimization model with all of its constraints at a glance is as follows: 
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Chapter 5: Solution Method 
 
5.1 Introduction to Heuristic approaches: 
There are several situations in which using traditional approaches cannot 




the objective function; discrete feasible region; lack of computational resources 
(not enough time, low memory, etc.). In these and many other cases where 
traditional methods are not well performing, heuristics are used to try to reach a 
feasible and near optimal or hopefully optimal solution. 
Using heuristics is highly preferable to exhaustive enumeration in cases 
where the feasibility domain is large because they take much less effort and time 
to reach an almost optimal solution. A heuristic can be as a simple random search.  
Meta-Heuristics are a higher level of optimization algorithms where the 
algorithm can be applied to almost any optimization problem. There are many 
famous Meta-Heuristics that are widely used. Some of them are as follows: 
 Simulated annealing 
 Tabu Search 
 Ant colony 
 Evolutionary Algorithms 
These are all guided random search techniques. Some of the heuristics are 
single-solution based local solution methods, such as: simulated annealing and 
tabu search, and some are population-based, such as Genetic Algorithms and Ant 
Colony. 
The idea behind evolutionary algorithms is derived from what happens in the 
real world. Usually, all Meta Heuristics require two functions: one that is in 
charge of evaluating solutions, and another one, which is in charge of generating 
new valid solutions, based on previous solutions. 
At the following subsections a brief description of some of the Meta-heuristics 
are provided. 
5.1.1 Simulated Annealing 
The root of Simulated Annealing is in Metallurgy. It is based on the idea 
that heating the material and using controlled cooling reduces its defects. The 
method has two important factors: the temperature (T) and the energy level (E) of 




temperature decreases as the process proceeds until it reaches zero. At each 
temperature, the energy level of each state and its neighbors are calculated. When 
minimizing the solution is under consideration, the probability of moving from a 
state with a higher level of energy to a lower level of energy based on the 
temperature is calculated and is positive, hence, meaning that the solution is 
moving downhill.  
In order to prevent the method from getting stuck in a local optimal, the 
probability of moving from a state with a lower state of energy to a neighbor with 
a higher energy level (moving uphill) is positive. But, the probability decreases as 
the difference between the two states’ increases.  
As the temperature (T) decreases, the method approaches more greedy 
methods. When the temperature is equal to 0, the method will be a greedy method 
(a hill climbing method). Therefore, in higher temperatures, the method moves 
uphill but, as the temperature decreases, the potential of moving uphill decreases.  
5.1.2 Tabu Search 
Tabu search is a local solution algorithm that claims it is more enhanced 
than the other local solution searches. Similar to other local search algorithms this 
method looks for better solutions in its neighborhood. The main improvement of 
this method is its database. Every solution in this method is called a Tabu (Taboo), 
and it is saved in the Tabu list, which is the database. Different solutions from 
different iterations are saved in this database. Every solution in the Tabu list can 
no longer be a solution for another iteration.  
There are some other ways to improve the search for optimality by using 
the Tabu list. One way is to put some illegal solutions in the database (tabu list). 
Hence, these illegal solutions will not be considered anymore while looking for 
optimality.   
5.1.3 Ant Colony 
The inspiration for this method was the ant’s behavior while searching for 




move in a path they leave indicators, which are called pheromones, on the path 
they have moved. These pheromones evaporate after a while (hence, the solutions 
hopefully do not fall in a local optimum point). When an ant senses the 
pheromones that are still available, it moves on that path.  
At the initial state where no pheromones are available, the ants move in 
completely random paths. In the second state where there are pheromones 
available in some paths, the probability of some other ants moving on those paths 
and placing some new pheromones increases. These new pheromones will ensure 
that the paths still have pheromones, and replace the evaporating ones. At the end 
of the process, the path with the shortest length will be the remaining path with 
pheromones.  
 
5.2 Evolutionary Algorithms 
Evolutionary Algorithms (EA) are in the generic population based 
optimization algorithm branch. EA’s are highly inspired by biological concepts. 
They use biological evolution techniques such as: mutation; crossover; elitism, to 
build a better solution. The selection is based on a fitness function, and higher 
probabilities of being selected for building the next solution are given to those 
with a higher fitness value. The most famous EA algorithm is Genetic Algorithm 
(GA). 
5.2.1 Introduction to Genetic Algorithms 
The main terminologies of GA are: 
 Chromosome: The data structure that represents the solution of an 
optimization problem 
 Gene: The smallest element of the Chromosome that is representative of a 
parameter of that solution (chromosome) 
 Fitness function: The function that weighs different chromosomes in terms of 
their value 




There are many benefits in using a GA, some are listed below: 
 They can handle a large number of variables 
 They are good for problems with discrete search spaces 
 They support multi-objective optimization 
 They can be applied to many different problems in many different fields and 
disciplines. 
 They can be used with other methods as a part of a hybrid algorithm. 






Figure 5- 1- The flowchart of a typical GA 
 
 










Each of the processes for GA is described below:  
 
Encoding: 
Encoding is the genetic representation of the possible solution. This state, 
while being the first process in GA is one of the most important and most 
challenging stages in developing a GA, if not the most. In order to be able to use a 
genetic algorithm heuristic, one has to be able to represent each solution as a 
chromosome. Binary variables can be easily represented using chromosomes. 
While encoding the chromosomes, it is very important to pay attention to 
the benefits wisely encoding a chromosome might have. Some of the benefits are: 
ease in decoding and reading the solutions and the ability to prevent illegal 
solutions. 
Since the variables of this research are binary, the way that the encoding has 
been done is: 
 Each gene represents a binary variable; 1 representing the variable being 
chosen; 0 representing the variable not being considered or selected. 
 Each gene is representing a scenario for bidding (k) on a certain project (c,t,n) 
: y(k,c,t,n) 
 The chromosomes structure is illustrated in Figure 5- 2. This is a part of a 
chromosome with t=2, k=2, n=2, and c>=2. As it can be seen, each color (two 
blocks aside each other) represents the bidding scenarios for each project. At a 
high level, the different “n”’s for each “c” and “t” are placed aside each other. 




each other. And finally, at the highest-level owners, “c”, are placed aside each 
other. As it can be seen from the figure, by having a chromosome, the solution 




t=1 t=2 t=1 
n=1 n=2 n=1 n=2 n=1 n=2 
k=1 k=2 k=1 k=2 k=1 k=2 k=1 k=2 k=1 k=2 k=1 k=2 
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Figure 5- 2- The structure of a binary Chromosome for the project selection model 
 
Initialization: 
During this process an initial population is generated. Usually this is done 
completely randomly. In cases where the variables are binary variables, to each 
gene of a chromosome either a 0 or a 1 will be assigned, randomly. Depending on 
the desired population size, chromosomes are initialized. These chromosomes are 
placed in the mating pool and are used for reproduction. 
In the structure of the  GA proposed in this research, initially, all of the 
genes for a chromosome are set to 0. Then, between all of the different bidding 
scenarios (“k”’s) for each project one is randomly selected and either a 0 or 1 is 
assigned to it. This means that just one bidding scenario will happen at the most. 
By using this mechanism as opposed to just randomly assigning 0’s and 1’s to the 
genes in a chromosome many illegal combinations are prevented. Therefore, the 
GA will perform better. 
Because random numbers generated by the computer are not really random 




because they all start with the same random seed, if we just run the GA one time 
we will not necessarily get a desirable result which is close enough to the 
optimum. Therefore, we run the GA more than one time with each one starting 
with a different random seed (which is inputted by the computers clock). As a 
result of having different random seeds, different initial populations are generated 
and therefore the chance of falling into a local optimal will be reduced due to the 
different initial populations. After building the initial population, based on the 
fitness function, the fitness value of each chromosome is calculated. 
 
Selection: 
During this process a portion of the chromosomes available (population) 
are selected for reproduction and are placed in the mating pool. This selection is 
based on the fitness value of the chromosomes. Usually, the chromosome with a 
higher fitness value is more likely to be chosen for reproduction. 
There are two famous methods used for selection: 
1- The roulette wheel method: Based on this method, each chromosome 
proportional to its fitness function will have a circular sector of the roulette 
wheel. In order to assign a sector of the roulette wheel to each 
chromosome they all should be normalized. Therefore, if each individuals 
fitness value is represented by  , its section will be equal to    
  ∑  (Holland, 1975). After assigning theses angles to the 
chromosomes, they are sorted in a descending order. Then a random 
number between 0 and 1 is generated, the first chromosome which its 
number is more than that order is picked. 
2- The tournament method: based on the binary tournament method, each 
time two chromosomes are randomly chosen and the one with a bigger 
fitness value is selected for the mating pool. This procedure is done 





Reproduction of GA: 







The two main methods for reproduction are known as Crossover and 




The major method which is used for producing new chromosomes is 
Crossover. The idea behind Crossover is that two (or more) parent chromosomes 
(parent) pair together and build two (or more) new (child) chromosomes. The two 
parent chromosomes are picked based on different methods. One popular way is 
to select them randomly. When the two parents are selected from the reproduction 
(mating) pool, they make new chromosomes by either one of the methods as 
follows: 
a) One point crossover: A point from the chromosomes are selected and from 
there the parent chromosomes are cut into two pieces, then the second half 
of the parent chromosomes swap their places together leading to the 





Figure 5- 3- One point crossover (Source: GEATbx) 
 
b) Multiple point crossover: The methodology in this method is similar to the 
one point crossover. The difference is that instead of just having one 
crossover point, this method has more crossover points. (Figure 5- 4)   
 
 
Figure 5- 4- Multiple point crossover (Source GEATbx) 
 
The point at which the swapping in either method happens (the crossover 
point) is selected in different ways. A common way is selecting it in a random 
way. The crossover helps the problem converge to a more local optimal solution. 
Throughout this research, we have used the one point crossover method. 
The crossover points are selected wisely in a manner that no illegal reproduced 
chromosomes are created. The crossover points are set to be randomly selected 
from the points that each project is ended (i.e., either the beginning of a gene 
which represents bidding scenario one or the ending point of a gene which 






t=1 t=2 t=1 
n=1 n=2 n=1 n=2 n=1 n=2 
k=1 k=2 k=1 k=2 k=1 k=2 k=1 k=2 k=1 k=2 k=1 k=2 
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
            
Figure 5- 5- Possible crossover points in the chromosome 
 
In Figure 5- 5, the vertical lines (red lines) underneath the chromosome 
show the possible crossover points. From the possibilities a crossover point is 
selected randomly for the procedure of crossover. The illegality that is prevented 
by this method is resulting from having different bidding price scenarios for one 
project happening all at the same time. 
 
Mutation: 
Another famous reproduction operator is mutation. Mutation is usually 
done after crossover and on the offspring’s of the crossover. It is done to prevent 
the solutions from falling into a local optimal point by stopping them from 
becoming too similar to each other. Mutation randomly changes one of the genes 
in the new offspring. The process is simple. At the beginning some genes (bits) 
are selected from the offspring and then they are randomly changed. When the 
genes are binary variables, it simply changes the genes which are selected for 
mutation from 0 to 1 and vice versa.(Figure 5- 6)  
 





1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 
Figure 5- 6- a &b – Mutation (the red gene which is selected for mutation has flipped its value 
 
The probability of mutation is a user defined parameter. It is usually set to 
a small number. If the mutation probability is set to 100% then, the GA would be 
just a random search technique. Mutation is done to allow diversity. 
In our GA to prevent illegal solutions the mutation is modified. Whenever a 
gene is selected for mutation there are two possibilities: 
1- The gene’s value is 1: When this happens, the gene’s value is simply 
switched to 0. 
2- The gene’s value is 0: There are two different sub-cases which might 
happen under this case: 
a. The project was selected before: This means that there is another 
gene that its value is one for that project (i.e. a gene representing a 
different bidding scenarios for that projects value is 1). When this 
is the case, the GA turns that genes which it value was already set 
to 1 into 0. And, flips the gene’s value which was selected for 
mutation into 1. 
b. The project was not selected before: Under this scenario, the 
gene’s value is simply flipped to 1. 
As it has been mentioned before, the illegality is due to different bidding 
scenarios happening at one time. Figure 5- 7 illustrates the procedure of mutation 
used in our GA. 
 
c=1 c=2 




n=1 n=2 n=1 n=2 n=1 n=2 
k=1 k=2 k=1 k=2 k=1 k=2 k=1 k=2 k=1 k=2 k=1 k=2 
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
  
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
case 1 
c=1 c=2 
t=1 t=2 t=1 
n=1 n=2 n=1 n=2 n=1 n=2 
k=1 k=2 k=1 k=2 k=1 k=2 k=1 k=2 k=1 k=2 k=1 k=2 
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
  
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
case 2-a 
c=1 c=2 
t=1 t=2 t=1 
n=1 n=2 n=1 n=2 n=1 n=2 




0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
  
0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 
case 2-b 




Elitism means that at least the best chromosome with the highest fitness 
value is copied into the new population so the best solution found can remain until 
the end. It is believed that elitism speeds up the convergence to an optimal 
solution. However on the downside, there are some criticisms that state that 
elitism prematurely limits the search to the local optimal solution.  
 
Termination: 
The final step in the GA is setting the termination criteria. The criteria are set 
such that when met the search for the optimal solution ends. If there were no 
termination criteria, theoretically, at the end the global optimal solution would 
have been found because eventually all solutions would have been generated. But 
since there are limitations in time and the cost and resources of running a program 
to a great extent of time, these criteria are set. There are different termination 
criteria which can be set individually or can be combined. Some of them are 
provided below: 
 Setting a maximum number of iterations 




 The average fitness of the population does not improve a lot any more (or does 
not improve at all) 
The stopping criterion used in this research is the combination of maximum 
number of iteration and the improvement in the average fitness. 
The Flowchart of the GA used in this research illustrated in Figure 5- 8: 
 
Figure 5- 8- The flowchart of the GA used for solving this model 




1- Set run = 0 
2- Set run = run +1 
3- Randomly create the first generation. 
4- Set iteration = 0 
5- Set iteration = iteration +1 
6- Evaluate the chromosomes (check fitness values). 
7- Select the chromosomes with the biggest fitness value and assign a higher 
probability for being selected as a parent for crossover.  
8- Do crossover. The parents are selected from the pool of chromosomes and 
the Roulette wheel method is used. 
9- Do mutation on the chromosomes. 
10- Select the chromosome with the highest fitness value and keep it in the 
pool (Elitism). 
11- If stopping criteria met, i.e. either enough iterations are done or the 
average fitness value of the population is not growing enough, go to step 
12, else go to step 5. 
12- If enough runs are made, go to step 14, else go to step 13. 
13- Generate a new random seed and go to step 2. 
14- Print solutions. 
5.2.2 Validating the GA with a small sample 
For the purpose of checking the coding of the GA and seeing how well it 
converges to the optimal solution, a small sample problem was solved by using 
enumeration and then it was solved by the GA. The GA was able to find the 
optimal value for this small sample. 
The sample consisted of 9 different projects which are provided by 3 
different owners at 5 different times. A summary table of the samples input is 
provided in Table 5- 1 and Table 5- 2 (in this sample all EV’s are set as 1): 
 
Table 5- 1- Example problem used for validating the GA 




Project c,t,n L Cost # of 
bidders 
P(k=10%) P(K=8%) Pm k=1 k=2 
1 1,1,1 7 151000 6 0.182 0.23 2 0.1 0.8 
2 2,1,1 4 229000 3 0.308 0.374 3 0.1 0.8 
3 3,1,1 5 159000 6 0.182 0.23 4 0.1 0.8 
4 1,2,1 6 66000 2 0.401 0.473 4 0.1 0.8 
5 1,2,2 5 316000 7 0.16 0.204 3 0.1 0.8 
6 3,3,1 7 292000 5 0.211 0.264 2 0.1 0.8 
7 2,3,1 3 145000 7 0.16 0.204 4 0.1 0.8 
8 2,5,1 3 26000 8 0.143 0.183 3 0.1 0.8 
9 3,5,1 5 175000 7 0.16 0.204 4 0.1 0.8 
 
Table 5- 2- The RHS’s of the project management constraint 
Tv 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
PMR 7 13 13 15 15 12 12 8 8 
 
The optimal answer to this small optimization problem was equal to: 
13606.41, which was resulted by choosing the following set of projects and 
bidding scenarios to bid on: 
Y 0 0 1 1 = 1 Index=6 
Y 0 1 0 0 = 1 Index=20 
Y 1 2 0 0 = 1 Index=41 
Y 0 2 2 0 = 1 Index=48 




The index numbers indicated in the front of the solutions are representing 
the gene number which represented that solution in the chromosome. Those which 
are equal to one, represent the bidding markups and their respective projects 
which are selected for bidding. By having these index numbers and being aware of 
the encoding of the chromosomes, the respective bidding scenario and the project 
could be calculated and vice versa. For example, for the project: 
 
Y 1 2 0 0 = 1 





The index is calculated using equation 5-1: 
 
                            (5-1) 
 
Where: 
  : the maximum of t which indicates the furthest time the user using this 
model is considering for projects to bid on. 
  : the maximum bidding scenarios for the projects 
  : the maximum projects offered at any time by any owner 
  : the total number of owners which provide all the projects 
 




      (   )        (   )      (   )    (   )  
                           
 It should be noted that this model outputs are only as good and reliable as 
the data available. This model is not capable of predicting future events. If there is 
no information about a very profitable project in the future the model is not 
capable of saving resources to be able to do that project in the future. However if 
the data is complete and available, the model is capable of making such sacrifices. 
 Also, due to the structure of this model, when the importance of eminence 
is high, the projects which are from a certain owner are more valuable. This 
model’s behavior makes it rely on projects which are provided by a few owners. 
This increases risk. If one of those specific owners suddenly changes its 
evaluation criteria and gives more weight to bidding price when evaluating bids, 
the reputation and degree of eminence that we have built becomes less valuable. 
Another instance that has a negative consequence is when the owner suddenly 
goes out of business. In that case all of the reputation and eminence we have built 




5.2.3 The Tuning of the GA 
Genetic Algorithm has three main parameters which have to be set at the start 
of the GA: 
1- Crossover Probability (  ): This parameter indicates how often Crossover 
takes place for generating the offsprings. If the probability is set to 100% 
this means that all offsprings are generated by the crossover of their 
parents. If it is set to 0%, all of the offsprings are the exact same as their 
parents (with the assumption that mutation is not occurring). 
2- Mutation Probability (  ): This parameter provides data on how often 
mutation takes place. If it is 100%, the whole chromosome is changed and 




3- Population size: This parameter informs that how many chromosomes are 
in a generation. If the number is low, only a small search space is being 
covered, but if it is high the GA slows down. So, this parameter has a big 
effect in the speed. 
A good combination of           will result into a good search that will not 
fall into local optimums. This combination is different for every GA. Hence, 
tuning the GA is very important. For the purpose of this research, since time was 
not a critical factor in the planning phase problems, the population size was set to 
1000 (which is a large enough size) and the tuning was done to find the best 
combination for the mutation and crossover probabilities. A small-size problem 
was solved under different probabilities and the fitness values were drawn. It is 
noteworthy to state that the stopping criteria in this GA was the minimum number 
of iterations between, 1000 and the number of iterations needed after which the 
average fitness value is not improved by 0.005.  10 different runs was done each 
time by starting with different random seeds to generate different starting points. 
In Figure 5- 9 and Table 5- 3, the best fitness value from the runs for each 
combination of           is presented. Further, the average of the 10 different 
runs (each starting with a different random seed) is plotted against different 
combinations of           in Figure 5- 10 through Figure 5- 12 and Table 5- 4 






Table 5- 3- The maximum fitness values resulted from different runs for each set of crossover and mutation pairs 
 
Crossover 
        
Mutation   0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9 
 
0 13606.41 13606.41 13606.41 13606.41 13606.41 13606.41 13606.41 13606.41 
 
0.03 13606.41 13606.41 13606.41 13606.41 13606.41 13606.41 13606.41 13606.41 
 
0.06 13606.41 13606.41 13606.41 13606.41 13606.41 13606.41 13606.41 13606.41 
 
0.09 13606.41 13606.41 13606.41 13606.41 13606.41 13606.41 13606.41 13606.41 
 
0.12 13606.41 13606.41 13606.41 13606.41 13606.41 13606.41 13606.41 13606.41 
 
0.15 13606.41 13606.41 13606.41 13606.41 13606.41 13606.41 13606.41 13606.41 
 
0.18 13606.41 13606.41 13606.41 13606.41 13606.41 13606.41 13606.41 13606.41 
 
0.21 13606.41 13606.41 13606.41 13606.41 13606.41 13606.41 13606.41 13606.41 
 
0.24 13606.41 13606.41 13606.41 13606.41 13606.41 13606.41 13606.41 13606.41 
 
0.27 13606.41 13606.41 13606.41 13606.41 13606.41 13606.41 13606.41 13606.41 
 
0.3 13606.41 13606.41 13606.41 13606.41 13606.41 13606.41 13606.41 13606.41 
 
0.33 13606.41 13606.41 13606.41 13606.41 13606.41 13606.41 13606.41 13606.41 
 
0.36 13606.41 13606.41 13606.41 13606.41 13606.41 13606.41 13606.41 13606.41 
 
0.39 13606.41 13606.41 13606.41 13606.41 13606.41 13606.41 13606.41 13606.41 
 
0.42 13606.41 13606.41 13606.41 13606.41 13606.41 13606.41 13606.41 13606.41 
 






Figure 5- 9- Fitness value Vs. pairs of mutation and crossover probabilities 
 
Table 5- 4- Average fitness values of different pairs of crossover and mutation probability for ten runs 
 
Mutation 
        
Crossover   0.00 0.03 0.06 0.09 0.12 0.15 0.18 0.21 
 
0.55 13391.47 13391.47 13391.47 13391.47 13425.30 13425.30 13425.30 13425.30 
 












































0.65 13425.30 13425.30 13425.30 13425.30 13425.30 13425.30 13425.30 13425.30 
 
0.70 13425.30 13425.30 13425.30 13425.30 13425.30 13425.30 13425.30 13425.30 
 
0.75 13425.30 13425.30 13425.30 13425.30 13425.30 13425.30 13425.30 13425.30 
 
0.80 13425.30 13425.30 13425.30 13425.30 13425.30 13425.30 13425.30 13425.30 
 
0.85 13425.30 13425.30 13425.30 13425.30 13425.30 13425.30 13425.30 13425.30 
 
0.90 13464.53 13509.82 13542.08 13414.88 13453.51 13535.44 13496.12 13498.16 
 
Table 5- 5 - Average fitness values of different pairs of crossover and mutation probability for ten runs (Continued) 
 
Mutation 
        
Crossover   0.24 0.27 0.30 0.33 0.36 0.39 0.42 0.45 
 
0.55 13425.30 13425.30 13425.30 13425.30 13425.30 13425.30 13425.30 13425.30 
 
0.60 13425.30 13425.30 13425.30 13425.30 13425.30 13425.30 13425.30 13425.30 
 
0.65 13425.30 13425.30 13425.30 13425.30 13425.30 13425.30 13425.30 13425.30 
 
0.70 13425.30 13425.30 13425.30 13425.30 13425.30 13425.30 13425.30 13425.30 
 
0.75 13425.30 13425.30 13425.30 13425.30 13425.30 13425.30 13425.30 13425.30 
 
0.80 13425.30 13425.30 13425.30 13425.30 13425.30 13425.30 13425.30 13425.30 
 
0.85 13425.30 13425.30 13425.30 13425.30 13425.30 13425.30 13425.30 13425.30 
 

























































































































































As it can be seen, all of the different combinations have led to the optimal 
solution, although on average, those for which the mutation and the crossover 
probabilities both have higher values have resulted in a better average fitness 
values resulting from 10 different runs. Hence, based on the averages, the 
combination of Mutation Probability of 0.45 and Crossover Probability of 0.9 was 












Chapter 6:  Results 
 
In this chapter, some sensitivity analysis is done on the results of the 
model and it is compared to the previous models that only consider the effect of 
bidding price in winning projects. In the first section of this chapter, sensitivity 
analysis and validation is provided. At the end of this chapter, the differences 
between this model and the previous project selection models are brought to 
attention and a comparison is provided. 
 
6.1 Sensitivity Analysis and Validation  
 6.1.1 Building a Base Model 
Getting access to real data for this thesis was very hard because companies 
usually don’t share their financial data and bidding data are usually confidential. 
Thus real data was not used in this thesis and was left out of the scope. 
In order to be able to perform sensitivity analysis, a base model should be 
generated. In this base model, there are only two owners who are providing 
projects. Owner number 1 is providing 5 projects and owner number 2 is 
providing only one project. The details of this example are available in Table 6- 1. 
A graphical presentation of the projects is provided in Figure 6- 1. In this base 
example, price and eminence and previous works were equally important 
(PI=RI=0.5). And for both owners, the initial eminence probability was set at 0.4 
.The rate of growth of the Probability of eminence was 0.3 up until the probability 
was 0.7, 0.05 until the probability was 0.9 and, 0.02 until the probability was 1. 
The resource availability at different times is always 6 project managers. For the 
purpose of simplicity it is also assumed that all projects are available 100% 
(EV=1). 
 
Table 6- 1 Base example for sensitivity analysis 
C t(month) n l(month) pm(man) cost($) EV # of 
competitors 




1 2 1 5 2 70000 1 4 
1 5 1 2 3 110000 1 4 
1 7 1 2 2 200000 1 4 
1 8 1 4 4 85000 1 4 






p1 2 2 2 2 
        
P2   2 2 2 2 2 
      
P3   
   
3 3 
      
P4   
     
2 2 
    
P5   
      
4 4 4 4 
 
C2 P1   4 4 4 4 4 
      
 
t 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
 
Figure 6- 1 Base case for Sensitivity Analysis graphical representation 
 
The different Markups which are used in this model are based on a 
research done by Groeger and based on the fact that the typical profit in the 
general contracting industry is 8% (Get A Quote). The average markup size for 
large bidders is 21.46% (Groeger, 2009). It is also assumed that the Standard 
deviation of the markup is 2%. Since the Profit is 8%, we decided to select the 
project markup cases such that a range of profit from around 1% to around 10% 
was covered. The increments of profits considered were 1 percent. Thus, in this 
base example we have 10 different bidding scenarios. Scenario number 1 indicates 
a markup of 14% and scenario number ten indicates a markup of 23%.  






Figure 6- 2 Eminence Probability Growth of examples 1 and 2 
Based on Figure 6- 2, the initial eminence is 0.4 with both owners, C1 and 
C2. Z1= 0.3, Z2= 0.05, and Z1= 0.02. And Lim1= 0.7, Lim2= 0.9, and Lim3= 1. It 
was assumed that for each project there are a total of 5 competitors (4 excluding 
the bidder using the model). 
Friedman’s model was used for combining different probabilities of 
winning from different competitors. This base case was solved using the proposed 
Genetic Algorithm. The largest feasible objective value gained from many runs 
was 60,136.9. 
However, the big variance between the feasible solutions from different 
runs lead to this thought that the solutions provided by this GA is not necessarily 
global optimal. They are good feasible solutions. The results from this example to 
some extent show the priority in selecting projects but when it comes to selecting 
the proper markups for the projects the trend cannot be derived clearly. In order to 
enhance the visibility and priority in selecting bids, another example was derived 
which is a subset of the main base problem. The difference between the sub-
problem and the main base problem is in only project provided by owner (client) 
number 2. In this sub-problem all the projects are only provided by owner 1. This 
reduction in the problem size reduced the variables (Genes) in the GA by half and 




negligible variance leads to this thought that the solution is hopefully optimum. 
The graphical representation of example 2 is provided below (Figure 6- 2). 
 
C1 
p1 2 2 2 2 
        
P2   2 2 2 2 2 
      
P3   
   
3 3 
      
P4   
     
2 2 
    
P5   
      
4 4 4 4 
 
 
t 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
 
PMR 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
Figure 6- 3 Subproblem (example 2) for Sensitivity Analysis 
   
In the next subsections, the results of sensitivity analysis on different 
parameters are provided. 
Example 1 is used to observe the changes in project selection and example 
2 is used for observing the changes in the markup percent.  
 6.1.2 Sensitivity on Eminence and Bidding Price importance 
For both examples provided in the previous subsection, the eminence 
relative importance is varied between 0 and 1. The increments are 0.1. The results 
for example one and two are captured in Table 6- 2 through Table 6- 5. Table 6- 2 
and Table 6- 3  present the selected projects, the proposed bidding markups, and 
the value of the objective function for the feasible solution which is presented. 
Table 6- 4 and Table 6- 5  present the Probability of eminence at the time the 






Table 6- 2 Project selected and Markups example 1 – Sensitivity Analysis on RI/PI 
 
PI= 1 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 
 
RI= 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
C1 
 Proj1 17 17 17 17 17 16 18 16 16 16 14 
Proj2         14 17 15 14 17 15 18 
Proj3         18 17 18 15 16 15 17 
Proj4 14 16 16 16 16 17 15 17 17 18 23 
Proj5 15 18 17 16 17 18 19 18 18 23 23 





93973.9 87307.1 80818.4 72616.7 64114.1 60136.9 50603.7 46925.3 42009.5 36606.6 34538.5 
 
  
Table 6- 3 Projects selected and Markups example 2 – Sensitivity Analysis on RI/PI 
 
PI= 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
 
RI= 1 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 
c1 
Proj1 14 15 16 16 16 16 17 17 17 17 17 
Proj2 16 16 16 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 
Proj3 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 
Proj4 23 18 18 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 










Table 6- 4 Eminence Probability example 1 – Sensitivity Analysis on RI/PI 
 
PI 1 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 
 
RI 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
C1 
1 0.4000 0.4000 0.4000 0.4000 0.4000 0.4000 0.4000 0.4000 0.4000 0.4000 0.4000 
2         0.6848 0.6962 0.6529 0.6962 0.6962 0.6962 0.6999 
3         0.7475 0.7468 0.7420 0.7494 0.7468 0.7492 0.7421 
4 0.6848 0.6848 0.6848 0.6848 0.7896 0.7943 0.7842 0.7992 0.7962 0.7991 0.7896 
5 0.7475 0.7468 0.7468 0.7468 0.8390 0.8418 0.8340 0.8467 0.8437 0.8413 0.7897 
C2 1 0.4000 0.4000 0.4000 0.4000               
 
Table 6- 5 Eminence Probability example 2 – Sensitivity Analysis on RI/PI 
 
RI= 1 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 
 
PI= 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
C1 
1 0.4000 0.4000 0.4000 0.4000 0.4000 0.4000 0.4000 0.4000 0.4000 0.4000 0.4000 
2 0.6999 0.6993 0.6962 0.6962 0.6962 0.6962 0.6848 0.6848 0.6848 0.6848 0.6848 
3 0.7494 0.7492 0.7487 0.7468 0.7468 0.7468 0.7449 0.7449 0.7449 0.7449 0.7449 
4 0.7968 0.7967 0.7962 0.7943 0.7943 0.7943 0.7924 0.7924 0.7924 0.7924 0.7924 






Based on Table 6- 2, whenever the importance of eminence is increased, all 
the projects which owner 1 is providing are preferred as opposed to selecting the 
projects which have the most profit (their price is more). This was expected, because 
by doing more projects for an owner the eminence probability increases over time. 
The increase in the eminence probability is desirable. On the other hand, if the 
importance of bidding price is high in evaluating bids, improving the eminence of the 
firm and doing previous works is no longer desirable. Therefore, those projects which 
have the most profit (cost more) are selected. 
Based on Table 6- 3 and Table 6- 5, as the importance of eminence increases, 
the initial markups proposed are smaller. These small markups increase the 
probability of winning and therefore the probability of winning based on eminence on 
later projects are increased. For example when eminence is the most important factor 
(RI=1 & PI=0), the initial markup is small to increase the chances of winning the 
future projects which are mainly based on eminence. When we reach to projects 4 and 
5, since these are the last projects that are being considered, there is no need to build 
eminence for future projects. Thus, the markups increase. On the other hand, when 
the price is the most important factor, the optimum combination of        
                                     are the same for all projects.  
 6.1.3 Sensitivity on the Growth Slope of the Eminence   
In this section, the slope of the steepest slope of the eminence function (Z1) is 
changed and the different results are provided. Table 6- 6 and Table 6- 7 provide the 
results, i.e. the selected projects, the proposed bidding markups, and the value of the 
objective function for the feasible solution for examples 1 and 2. Table 6- 8 and Table 





Table 6- 6 Projects selected and Markups example 1 – Sensitivity Analysis on Z1 
 
Z1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 
C1 
Proj1 17 17 16 17 17 17 16 17 
Proj2   17 17 14 17 14 14 14 
Proj3   17 17 18 18 17 15 18 
Proj4 17 18 17 17 17 16 18 17 
Proj5 18 15 18 15 19 16 17 18 





51887.8 56561.2 60136.9 58936.5 59992.2 60355.5 60278.9 61209.8 
 
Table 6- 7 Projects selected and Markups example 2 – Sensitivity Analysis on Z1 
 
Z1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 
C1 
Proj1 17 17 16 17 17 17 17 17 
Proj2 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 
Proj3 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 
Proj4 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 










Table 6- 8 Eminence probabilities example 1 – Sensitivity Analysis on Z1 
 
Z1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 
C1 
Proj1 0.4000 0.4000 0.4000 0.4000 0.4000 0.4000 0.4000 0.4000 
Proj2   0.5899 0.6962 0.7100 0.7175 0.7225 0.7279 0.7287 
Proj3   0.7199 0.7468 0.7600 0.7649 0.7725 0.7779 0.7787 
Proj4 0.4949 0.7674 0.7943 0.8021 0.8071 0.8199 0.8278 0.8209 
Proj5 0.5899 0.8096 0.8418 0.8496 0.8546 0.8693 0.8699 0.8683 
C2 Proj1 0.4000               
 
Table 6- 9 Eminence Probabilities example 2- Sensitivity Analysis on Z1 
 
Z1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 
C1 
Proj1 0.4000 0.4000 0.4000 0.4000 0.4000 0.4000 0.4000 0.4000 
Proj2 0.4949 0.5899 0.6962 0.7100 0.7175 0.7225 0.7260 0.7287 
Proj3 0.5899 0.7199 0.7468 0.7574 0.7649 0.7699 0.7735 0.7762 
Proj4 0.6848 0.7674 0.7943 0.8049 0.8124 0.8174 0.8210 0.8237 






Based on Table 6- 6 and Table 6- 8, it can be observed that when the growth 
in eminence due to doing previous works is not high, the model decides to do the 
most profitable set of projects except for focusing on improving the eminence. On the 
other hand, as the slope increases, the model prefers to select projects from the same 
owner to increase the chances of winning dramatically by improving the eminence 
probability noticeably.   
Based on Table 6- 8 and Table 6- 9, it can be concluded that the markups are not very 
sensitive to the change in slope. The only point that a change in markup strategy was 
observed was in the base example number 2. Where the initial markup is 16% and the 
rest of the markups are all 17%. This could be due to the fact that by using a markup 
of 16% the eminence probability will be almost equal to 0.7 which is the second 
threshold. After that threshold (eminence probability = 0.7) the probability will grow 
in a smaller rate (0.05). 
6.1.4 Sensitivity on the cost of projects 
In this section, the cost of the only project provided by owner 2 is varied and 
the different results are provided. Table 6- 10 provides the results, i.e. the selected 
projects, the proposed bidding markups, and the value of the objective function for 
the feasible solution for example1. Table 6- 11 presents the probability of winning 











230000 240000 250000 260000 270000 280000 290000 300000 310000 320000 330000 
C1 
Proj1 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 
Proj2 17 17 17 17 17 17           
Proj3 17 17 17 17 17 17           
Proj4 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 
Proj5 18 18 18 18 18 18 17 16 15 15 18 














230000 240000 250000 260000 270000 280000 290000 300000 310000 320000 330000 
C1 
Proj1 0.4000 0.4000 0.4000 0.4000 0.4000 0.4000 0.4000 0.4000 0.4000 0.4000 0.4000 
Proj2 0.6962 0.6962 0.6962 0.6962 0.6962 0.6962           
Proj3 0.7468 0.7468 0.7468 0.7468 0.7468 0.7468           
Proj4 0.7943 0.7943 0.7943 0.7943 0.7943 0.7943 0.6962 0.6962 0.6962 0.6962 0.6962 
Proj5 0.8418 0.8418 0.8418 0.8418 0.8418 0.8418 0.7468 0.7468 0.7468 0.7468 0.7468 










Whenever costs of projects increase while the markups remain the same, the 
overall profit will increase. As it can be seen in Table 6- 10, this behavior is captured. 
Up to the cost of $280,000 although the profit of doing that project is increasing, it is 
not worth the loss in the eminence. After $290,000, the profit has increased so much 
that not selecting a project which increases eminence is justified. 
 6.1.5 Sensitivity on the Initial Eminence Probability 
In this section, initial eminence of owner 1 is varied and the results are 
provided in Table 6- 12 and Table 6- 13, i.e. the selected projects, the proposed 
bidding markups, and the value of the objective function for the feasible solution for 
examples 1 and 2. Table 6- 14 and Table 6- 15 present the probability of winning 










0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 1 
C1 
1 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 18 
2 17 16 18 17 18 15 16 19 18 
3 18 15 18 17 19 19 17 16 15 
4 17 16 17 15 18 17 16 18 18 
5 19 16 15 17 19 16 17 16 18 













0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 1 
C1 
Proj1 17 16 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 18 
Proj2 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 18 
Proj3 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 18 
Proj4 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 18 18 








58470 60335.4 61999.1 63934.4 66325 75712.1 79672.9 83470.3 90945.9 93711.5 
 
 




0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 1 
C1 
1 0.4000 0.5000 0.6000 0.7000 0.8000 0.8500 0.9000 0.9500 1.0000 
2 0.6848 0.7141 0.7308 0.7475 0.8475 0.8975 0.9190 0.9690 1.0000 
3 0.7449 0.7635 0.7730 0.7949 0.8896 0.9189 0.9387 0.9816 1.0000 
4 0.7871 0.8134 0.8151 0.8424 0.9084 0.9315 0.9577 1.0000 1.0000 
5 0.8346 0.8628 0.8626 0.8923 0.9253 0.9505 0.9775 1.0000 1.0000 




Table 6- 15 Eminence Probabilities example 2- Sensitivity Analysis on CTE of C1 
CTE of 
C1 
0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 1 
Proj1 0.3000 0.4000 0.5000 0.6000 0.7000 0.8000 0.8500 0.9000 0.9500 1.0000 
Proj2 0.5848 0.6962 0.7141 0.7308 0.7475 0.8475 0.8975 0.9190 0.9690 1.0000 
Proj3 0.7449 0.7468 0.7616 0.7783 0.7949 0.8949 0.9180 0.9380 0.9880 1.0000 
Proj4 0.7924 0.7943 0.8091 0.8258 0.8424 0.9170 0.9370 0.9570 1.0000 1.0000 







Based on table 6-12, the change in the initial eminence of owner C1 will not 
change the projects selected. This is due to the fact that the eminence of owner C2 is 
kept constant and it is not competing with the projects provided by owner C1 when 
the initial eminence is increased. Even the earlier projects provided by owner C1 for 
which the contractor’s eminence has not increased are more desirable. 
Based on Table 6- 13, the markup percent is not very sensitive to the initial 
eminence whenever the initial eminence is not extremely high. The only markup 
which is different than 17% for the cases that the initial eminence is less than or equal 
to 0.9 is for when the initial eminence is 0.6. When the initial eminence is 0.6, the 
first project’s proposed markup is 16%. This is due to the fact that when the markup 
is set at 16%, the eminence for the next project is almost 0.7 which is the threshold 
for the growth of eminence. 
In the cases that the initial eminence is higher than 0.95, and when the 
eminence has hit its maximum value which is 1, based on Table 6- 15 and Table 6- 13 
it can be seen that the markup percent is increased to 18%. This is due to the fact that 
when the eminence is at its maximum, there is no need to decrease the bidding 
markup to increase the eminence anymore. 
For the cases that the eminence is 1, the driving factors in evaluating bids are 
the markup, and the relative importance of bidding price and eminence. So, the model 
no longer tries to bid lower. It is in a way similar to the case that eminence is no 
longer important (RI=0, PI=1). By comparing Table 6- 3 and Table 6- 13, it can be 
concluded that the markup has increased from the case that PI=1 in Table 6- 3. This is 
expected, because although eminence is not growing anymore in the cases that the 
eminence probability is 1, but since in Table 6- 13 the importance of bidding price is 
less than the example of Table 6- 3 and the eminence in Table 6- 13 is 1, there is 




 6.1.6 Sensitivity Analysis on the number of competing parties in an auction 
In this section, the number of competitors who are competing for the only 
project owner C2 is providing is varied in example1. In example 2, the number of 
competitors in all the projects provided by owner 1 is varied. Table 6- 16 and Table 
6- 17 provide the results, i.e. the selected projects, the proposed bidding markups, and 
the value of the objective function for the feasible solution for examples 1 and 2. 
Table 6- 18 and Table 6- 19 present the probability of winning from an average 
bidder based on eminence. 
 
 






1 2 3 4 5 
C1 
1 16 16 16 16 16 
2     17 17 17 
3     17 17 17 
4 17 18 17 17 17 
5 16 17 18 18 18 









Table 6- 17 Projects selected and Markup Example 2- Sensitivity Analysis on number of competitors 
 
# CMT for all projects by 
owner C1 
1 2 3 4 5 
C1 
Proj1 18 17 17 16 16 
Proj2 19 17 17 17 16 
Proj3 19 18 17 17 17 
Proj4 19 18 17 17 17 
Proj5 19 18 18 17 17 
 












1 2 3 4 5 
C1 
1 0.4000 0.4000 0.4000 0.4000 0.4000 
2     0.6962 0.6962 0.6962 
3     0.7468 0.7468 0.7468 
4 0.6962 0.6962 0.7943 0.7943 0.7943 
5 0.7468 0.7415 0.8418 0.8418 0.8418 
C2 1 0.4000 0.4000       
 
 
Table 6- 19 Eminence Probabilities example 2- Sensitivity Analysis on number of competitors 
 
# CMT for all projects by 
owner C1 
1 2 3 4 5 
C1 
Proj1 0.4000 0.4000 0.4000 0.4000 0.4000 
Proj2 0.6529 0.6848 0.6848 0.6962 0.6962 
Proj3 0.7236 0.7449 0.7449 0.7468 0.7487 
Proj4 0.7551 0.7871 0.7924 0.7943 0.7962 
Proj5 0.7865 0.8292 0.8399 0.8418 0.8437 
 
As it can be seen in Table 6- 16, as the number of competitors for the project 
decreases, the project becomes more desirable and hence it gets selected for bidding. 
Based on Table 6- 17, as the number of competitors decrease the bidding markup 
increases. This was expected, because as the number of competitors decrease the 
utilities values increase and also a change in any of the probabilities of wining from 
other competitors will not be very significant because their power decreases. 
 
6.2 Major difference of this model with previous models 
Based on the results from the sensitivity analysis, there are two major effects 
considering eminence (the number of projects awarded) will have on selecting 




1- The effect it has on selecting the bidding price of each project. 
2- The effect it has on selecting the set of projects to bid on. 
In the following subsections, these effects are explained in more detail. 
6.1.1 The Bidding Price Effect 
Considering eminence has an effect on the bidding price. As the importance of 
eminence increases, the markup selected for prior projects decreases. After the 
eminence probability has reached a certain level, the markup starts to increase and 
reaches its maximum possible when the eminence probability equals to 1. This effect 
is illustrated in table 6-3.  
6.1.2 The Project Selection Effect 
This effect demonstrates how the relative importance of eminence will lead to 
taking projects from the same owner in order to increase the probability of winning 
due to eminence. This effect can be observed in Table 6- 2. 
 
6.3 Comparison with previous models 
 For the purpose of illustrating the effect the model proposed in this research 
has on the expected profit, a set of simple examples are generated. Then Monte Carlo 
simulation is used to compare the different solutions from this model with the most 
famous model which uses only monetary criteria.  
For the purpose of simplicity in these examples it is assumed that there is no 
resource (PM) limitation and the contractor can bid on all projects which are all 
provided by the same owner. Based on what has been explained in the previous 
section, the contractors’ behaviors using the previous models are expected to be 
different than those whom will use this model. These differences are due to different 
possible decisions. These decisions can be broken into two different levels. The first 




level decision that is made after the first level decision is selecting an appropriate 
markup. The markup should be selected in a way which leaves the contractor with a 
sufficient profit and at the same time a high enough chance of winning the auction. 
Having no limitation (no resource limitations) in choosing projects to bid on, 
leads to bidding on all the available projects. Therefore, the first level decision is 
already made. The only decision to be made is therefore picking an appropriate 
markup. 
    The objective of most of the research which face uncertainty is to maximize or 
minimize the expectation of a consequence. The formulation of the expected profit 
was provided in chapter 3 and was as follows: 
       (  )              (3-1) 
Where: 
        (  ): is the expected profit for project “i”. 
      : is the probability that project “i” would be awarded to the contractor. 
      : is the profit associated with project “i” if the project is done. 
The expected profit of each project is demonstrated from the probability of 
winning and the profit of that project. Both of these elements are dependent on 
markup. When a higher markup is selected, the profit increases but on the downside, 
the probability of winning an auction decreases. 
When the markup is known, calculating the profit is straightforward. Profit is 
equal to the product of [1+ markup] and the cost of the project. The difficult part is 
finding the probability of winning based on markup and eminence/previous works.  
The difficulty in calculating the probability of winning based on price, and 
eminence and previous works was due to the dependency of two probabilities. The 
first probability was the probability of winning the auction based on price. The 




works. Since these two probabilities are not necessarily independent we cannot 
calculate the overall probability of winning by multiplying the two probabilities by 
together. 
Due to this difficulty, calculating an overall probability of winning based on a 
specific markup and a certain level of eminence is not easy. In order to assess such 
probability we use Monte Carlo simulation. The procedure of this simulation is 









At the first stage of this simulation and for the first iteration, for each 
competitor we generate a random markup percent that they will use for bidding on the 
first project. This random number is generated by using the NORM.INV function of 
MS Excel. The Normal distribution used for generating random markups as 
mentioned before, is collected from historical bidding behaviors of the competitors. 
And if no historical data is available we use the mean and variance of the industry for 
defining the distribution. In this case similar to examples 1 and 2 earlier in this 
chapter a standard deviation of 2% and a mean of 21.46% is used. 
         At the next stage we generate random initial eminence winning probabilities for 
the other competitors. These are probabilities of winning in an auction in which the 
only evaluation criterion is eminence and previous works. These random numbers are 
generated by using a uniform distribution and MS Excel’s “rand()” function. 
In the next level we put ourselves in the shoes of the client/owner. We introduce an 
overall evaluation index that based on its value the winner of the auction is awarded. 
The evaluation index covers both monetary criteria (markup %) and non-
monetary criteria (eminence/previous works). Based on the preference of the owner a 
weighting index is introduced. The evaluation index is formulated as follows: 
 
      (     )               (6-1) 
 
Where: 
 “i" is the index which represents the i'th competitor 
     is the biding Markup which competitor i uses for this project 
     is a weighting factor which represents the relative importance of price 
(markup) in the evaluation criteria of owner/client “c” 




      is the eminence which competitor “i" has with owner “c” 
It should be noted that comparing different bids using the index used above is 
only one reasonable way. This only covers one reasonable mindset that the people in 
charge of evaluating bids might have. 
After comparing the evaluation indexes of different competitors, the one with 
the highest index is selected as the winner. The winner of the auction’s eminence 
increases as a result of building a relationship with the owner. Therefore, while 
everybody else’s probability of winning based on eminence stays constant, the 
winner’s eminence probability increases by using the eminence probability growth 
function provided in chapter 4. The eminence probability function parameters used 
are similar to example 2 from this chapter. Obviously, it is assumed that in this 
example and for each iteration, for all 6 different projects, the competitors remain the 
same. 
As a result of this change in the eminence probabilities, the next projects’ 
evaluation indexes for each competitor changes even if the markups are the same. 
After all projects are simulated, another iteration is done with different 
random numbers for markup and initial eminence for the competitors. These 
iterations go on until the stopping criterion is met. The stopping criterion is a cap on 
the number of iterations which should be done to achieve a certain level of 
confidence. This cap can be calculated by using Chebyshev’s inequality which stands 
for all distributions: 
 
   
 






where   is the confidence level and   is the acceptable error. For example, the 
number of iterations needed for a 95% confidence (      ) and an error of 0.01 
(      ) is 50,000. 
After the stopping criterion is met, the probability of winning based on 
eminence and price can be assessed. The probabilities which are based on frequency 
are calculated using equation 6-3. 
 
     
    




       is equal to the probability that competitor “i" wins project “j”  
      is the number of iterations of the Monte Carlo simulation in which 
competitor “i" wins the bid for project “j” 
    is the total number of iterations required for achieving a certain level of 
confidence in the Monte Carlo simulation (derived from equation 6-2) 
Using this probability and by having the profit of each project. The expected 
profit of each project can be calculated for the contractor. 
The probabilities resulted from the simulation are highly depending on the 
markup which we are going to use. For the purpose of comparison, the two markups 
used for simulation are: The markup proposed by the new model introduced in this 
research which considers eminence and previous works in addition to monetary 
values, and the markup which only considers monetary values. 
Once the expected profit of each project is calculated for each markup, the overall 
profit of those sets of projects is calculated by summing all of the expected profits of 




In the first subsection, the example which is going to be used for comparison is 
going to be illustrated and in the next subsection the comparison is provided. 
 6.3.1 Example Illustration 
As explained in the previous section, the goal of this comparison is to 
compare and show the difference between this model and the models which only 
consider monetary criteria in the second stage of decision making, selecting 
appropriate markups. Project selection is not of concern in this example. Thus, we 
assume that all of the 6 projects which are provided by one owner are selected for 










C(owner) t(month) N 
l 
(months) 
Pm cost($) EV # of cmt 
C1 
P1 1 1 1 1 2 100000 1 2 
P2 1 2 1 1 2 70000 1 2 
P3 1 3 1 1 2 110000 1 2 
P4 1 4 1 1 2 200000 1 2 
P5 1 5 1 1 2 85000 1 2 






The attributes regarding the eminence probability function, the initial 
eminence, and different bidding scenarios are provided in Table 6- 21, Table 6- 22, 
and Table 6- 23. The initial index of eminence with the owner is assumed to be 0.4. 
Table 6- 21 Eminence Probability Parameters, example for comparison 
Z Slope Lim limit 
Z1 0.3 Lim1 0.7 
Z2 0.05 Lim2 0.9 
Z3 0.02 Lim3 1 
 
 


































1 14.00% 10 18.50% 19 23.00% 
2 14.50% 11 19.00% 20 23.50% 
3 15.00% 12 19.50% 21 24.00% 
4 15.50% 13 20.00% 22 24.50% 
5 16.00% 14 20.50% 23 25.00% 
6 16.50% 15 21.00% 24 25.50% 
7 17.00% 16 21.50% 25 26.00% 
8 17.50% 17 22.00% 






 6.3.2 Comparison Results 
As discussed while doing sensitivity analysis on the relative importance of 
eminence and price (PI and RI), the solution is very dependent on these two 
parameters. Therefore, similarly to what was done in section 6.1.2, for the example 
provided in the previous subsection, the model is executed for different combinations 





Table 6- 24 Markup percent for different combinations for PI and RI, comparison example 
 
PI= 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
 
RI= 1 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 
c1 
Proj1 16 16.5 16.5 17 17 17 17 17.5 17.5 17.5 17.5 
Proj2 17 17 17 17 17.5 17.5 17.5 17.5 17.5 17.5 17.5 
Proj3 17.5 17.5 17.5 17.5 17.5 17.5 17.5 17.5 17.5 17.5 17.5 
Proj4 26 26 18.5 18 18 18 18 17.5 17.5 17.5 17.5 
Proj5 18 18 18 18 18 18 17.5 17.5 17.5 17.5 17.5 











The solution provided by setting PI equal to one is the solution which 
previous models would have provided. So, using each pair of PI and RI, the Monte 
Carlo simulation is executed for 50,000 iterations to achieve a confidence level of 
95% and error of 1%. Then each pair’s results are compared to the result gained from 
PI=1 and RI=0. The results are available in Table 6- 25. In this table, the first six 
rows of each pair of RI and PI represent the probability of winning each of the 
different projects. The first column represents the results derived from setting all the 
markups equal to 17.5% which is equal to only considering monetary criteria. And 
the second column represents using the markups provided by the model. The next six 
rows are dedicated to the markups used for simulation. The next six rows are 
dedicated to the expected profit of each of the projects. The final row for each pair 
represents the total expected profit from the entire portfolio of projects. 
Table 6- 25 Comparison results from Monte Carlo simulation 
  
PI=0 PI=0.1 PI=0.2 PI=0.3 
RI=1 RI=0.9 RI=0.8 RI=0.7 
M M&NM M M&NM M M&NM M M&NM 
P1 0.9535 0.95264 0.56272 0.55886 0.31284 0.31092 0.24478 0.24128 
P2 0.95284 0.95236 0.655 0.65344 0.31502 0.31312 0.24478 0.24128 
P3 0.95324 0.95276 0.71024 0.70976 0.31534 0.3135 0.24478 0.24128 
P4 0.95346 0.95254 0.75212 0.75236 0.31544 0.31372 0.24478 0.24128 
P5 0.95306 0.95376 0.78686 0.7865 0.31558 0.31372 0.24478 0.24128 
P6 0.9542 0.9535 0.81712 0.81586 0.31564 0.31386 0.24478 0.24128 
M1 17.50% 16.00% 17.50% 16.50% 17.50% 16.50% 17.50% 17.00% 
M2 17.50% 17.00% 17.50% 17.00% 17.50% 17.00% 17.50% 17.00% 
M3 17.50% 17.50% 17.50% 17.50% 17.50% 17.50% 17.50% 17.50% 
M4 17.50% 26.00% 17.50% 26.00% 17.50% 18.50% 17.50% 18.00% 
M5 17.50% 18.00% 17.50% 18.00% 17.50% 18.00% 17.50% 18.00% 
M6 17.50% 26.00% 17.50% 26.00% 17.50% 26.00% 17.50% 18.50% 
EP1 16686.25 15242.24 9847.6 9221.19 5474.7 5130.18 4283.65 4101.76 
EP2 11672.29 11333.08 8023.75 7775.936 3858.995 3726.128 2998.555 2871.232 
EP3 18349.87 18340.63 13672.12 13662.88 6070.295 6034.875 4712.015 4644.64 
EP4 33371.1 49532.08 26324.2 39122.72 11040.4 11607.64 8567.3 8686.08 
EP5 14176.77 14592.53 11704.54 12033.45 4694.253 4799.916 3641.103 3691.584 






132662.8 166059.9 102461.3 130604.6 43843.15 50067.57 34055.02 34261.76 
  
PI=0.4 PI=0.5 PI=0.6 PI=0.7 
RI=0.6 RI=0.5 RI=0.4 RI=0.3 
M M&NM M M&NM M M&NM M M&NM 
P1 0.21084 0.21948 0.1918 0.19666 0.1806 0.18402 0.17628 0.17368 
P2 0.21084 0.21948 0.1918 0.19666 0.1806 0.18402 0.17628 0.17368 
P3 0.21084 0.21948 0.1918 0.19666 0.1806 0.18402 0.17628 0.17368 
P4 0.21084 0.21948 0.1918 0.19666 0.1806 0.18402 0.17628 0.17368 
P5 0.21084 0.21948 0.1918 0.19666 0.1806 0.18402 0.17628 0.17368 
P6 0.21084 0.21948 0.1918 0.19666 0.1806 0.18402 0.17628 0.17368 
M1 17.50% 17.00% 17.50% 17.00% 17.50% 17.00% 17.50% 17.50% 
M2 17.50% 17.50% 17.50% 17.50% 17.50% 17.50% 17.50% 17.50% 
M3 17.50% 17.50% 17.50% 17.50% 17.50% 17.50% 17.50% 17.50% 
M4 17.50% 18.00% 17.50% 18.00% 17.50% 18.00% 17.50% 17.50% 
M5 17.50% 18.00% 17.50% 18.00% 17.50% 17.50% 17.50% 17.50% 
M6 17.50% 18.50% 17.50% 18.00% 17.50% 18.00% 17.50% 18.00% 
EP1 3689.7 3731.16 3356.5 3343.22 3160.5 3128.34 3084.9 3039.4 
EP2 2582.79 2688.63 2349.55 2409.085 2212.35 2254.245 2159.43 2127.58 
EP3 4058.67 4224.99 3692.15 3785.705 3476.55 3542.385 3393.39 3343.34 
EP4 7379.4 7901.28 6713 7079.76 6321 6624.72 6169.8 6078.8 
EP5 3136.245 3358.044 2853.025 3008.898 2686.425 2737.298 2622.165 2583.49 
EP6 8486.31 9338.874 7719.95 8141.724 7269.15 7618.428 7095.27 7190.352 
EP-
portfolio 
29333.12 31242.98 26684.18 27768.39 25125.98 25905.42 24524.96 24362.96 
  
PI=0.8 PI=0.9 PI=1 
  
RI=0.2 RI=0.1 RI=0 
  
M M&NM M M&NM M M&NM 
  
P1 0.16746 0.1721 0.16358 0.1646 0.15806 0.15966 
  
P2 0.16746 0.1721 0.16358 0.1646 0.15806 0.15966 
  
P3 0.16746 0.1721 0.16358 0.1646 0.15806 0.15966 
  
P4 0.16746 0.1721 0.16358 0.1646 0.15806 0.15966 
  
P5 0.16746 0.1721 0.16358 0.1646 0.15806 0.15966 
  
P6 0.16746 0.1721 0.16358 0.1646 0.15806 0.15966 
  
M1 17.50% 17.50% 17.50% 17.50% 17.50% 17.50% 
  
M2 17.50% 17.50% 17.50% 17.50% 17.50% 17.50% 
  
M3 17.50% 17.50% 17.50% 17.50% 17.50% 17.50% 
  
M4 17.50% 17.50% 17.50% 17.50% 17.50% 17.50% 
  
M5 17.50% 17.50% 17.50% 17.50% 17.50% 17.50% 
  
M6 17.50% 17.50% 17.50% 17.50% 17.50% 17.50% 
  





EP2 2051.385 2108.225 2003.855 2016.35 1936.235 1955.835 
  
EP3 3223.605 3312.925 3148.915 3168.55 3042.655 3073.455 
  
EP4 5861.1 6023.5 5725.3 5761 5532.1 5588.1 
  
EP5 2490.968 2559.988 2433.253 2448.425 2351.143 2374.943 
  




23297.87 23943.41 22758.07 22899.98 21990.1 22212.7 
  
Based on the different values in the expected profit of the portfolios which are 
resulted from selecting different markups provided by this new model and the models 
which only consider monetary value, the increase/decrease in the expected value can 
be calculated. These values are provided in Table 6- 26.  
 
Table 6- 26 Percentage of change in the expected profit between models 
  
PI=0 PI=0.1 PI=0.2 PI=0.3 
RI=1 RI=0.9 RI=0.8 RI=0.7 
M M&NM M M&NM M M&NM M M&NM 
EP-
portfolio 
132662.8 166059.9 102461.3 130604.6 43843.15 50067.57 34055.02 34261.76 
Difference 25.17% 27.47% 14.20% 0.61% 
  
PI=0.4 PI=0.5 PI=0.6 PI=0.7 
RI=0.6 RI=0.5 RI=0.4 RI=0.3 
M M&NM M M&NM M M&NM M M&NM 
EP-
portfolio 
29333.12 31242.98 26684.18 27768.39 25125.98 25905.42 24524.96 24362.96 
Difference 6.51% 4.06% 3.10% -0.66% 
  
PI=0.8 PI=0.9 PI=1 
  RI=0.2 RI=0.1 RI=0 
  M M&NM M M&NM M M&NM 
  EP-
portfolio 
23297.87 23943.41 22758.07 22899.98 21990.1 22212.7 
  Difference 2.77% 0.62% 1.01% 
   
Based on this table, for this specific mindset for evaluating bids, the 





Chapter 7: Conclusions and future works 
7.1 Summary and Conclusions 
In an environment where the main source for profit are projects, and for 
almost each project there are many competitors who are bidding, wisely choosing the 
best set of projects is of essence. Therefore, a model that can assist contractors in 
choosing the best set of projects is very useful. It can increase the expected profit of 
the contractor up to 25%. 
In this research, a mathematical model was proposed that considers both monetary 
and non-monetary criteria while selecting projects to bid on and the best markup 
percentage for preparing bidding price for those projects. By looking at the literature, 
it was identified that reputation and doing previous works for owners is the most 
important non-monetary evaluation criteria that owners use. Taking into account this 
criterion allows this model to consider the effect of the contractor’s size (this effect is 
related to the initial eminence constant at time t=1,     ) and the effect of having 
preferential bidders for an auction which the importance of having a model that 
considers both of them is reinforced by the literature 
The Fico Xpress-mosel optimization solver was not able to solve the model, so meta-
heuristics were used to solve this optimization problem. After preliminary 
investigations a Genetic Algorithm was selected as the heuristic for solving this 
nonlinear binary model. 
 Based on our findings, considering eminence in the project selection model 
has two major effects: 
1- The bidding price effect: the tenderers tend to bid with a higher markup on 
projects that the owners providing them give more importance to eminence 
compared to the bidding price while evaluating different tenderers in an 
auction. 
2- The project selection effect: the tenderers bid on projects related to the 




and provides many projects later in the time stream, until a certain threshold, 
contractors choose to bid on their projects even if their profits are slightly less 
compared to other projects. This is done to build up their  degree of eminence 
and to increase their chances of winning in later projects, which are provided 
by that owner. On the other hand, if an owner does not consider eminence as 
an important factor for evaluating tenderers, the contractors only pay attention 
to those sets of projects that have the maximum profits for them and they have 
no incentive to build up their degree of being eminent with those owners. 
7.2 Future works 
This research opens a door to a number of potential avenues for future 
investigations. Some of them are as follows: 
 Modeling the problem as a multi-objective problem by minimizing risk while 
maximizing profit. 
 Calculating the value of perfect information of the occurrence of the projects 
(      ). 
 Calculating the value of perfect information of the actual winners in each tender. 
 Further investigation on different meta-heuristics, namely, simulated annealing, 
and comparing the solutions. 
 Considering different mindsets for evaluating auctioneers in the Monte Carlo 
simulation. 
 Finding real data and comparing the results to real data. 
 Building a more comprehensive model by considering other criteria used for 
evaluating bids in the model. 
 Relaxing the assumption of having deterministic costs and allowing cost variances 
for each project. 
 Considering the risk of relying on too few owners for projects. 





 Considering the effect of past project performance on the degree of eminence and 
reputation. Including cases where all projects do not meet desired performances 
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